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Summary  findings
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strategies, joint Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers  framework. Public expenditures on basic services were
(PRSPs)  will bring together the country's  own priorities  significantly increased after adoption of the PEAP in
and Bank-Fund assistance to the country.  1997.
In Uganda, such a strategy has existed for several years.  Mackinnon and Reinikka discuss the general
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ii1. Introduction
The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund are currently developing a new
approach to enhance the poverty impact of their concessional assistance in low-income
countries. Those countries receiving debt relief under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries
(HIPC) initiative will be among the first to benefit. The focus of this new approach is to
help  recipient  countries build  more  effective poverty reduction  strategies  through  a
participatory and inclusive process. These strategies are then expected to  form the basis
for a joint Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), which brings together the country's
own strategy and Bank-Fund assistance to the country. In brief, the PRSP is an effort to
help mainstream poverty reduction in the recipient country's  public policy.  As  such,
PRSPs should start from existing government strategies and build on them. This paper
considers a case where such a strategy has existed for several years, Uganda.
Uganda is one of the first low-income countries to prepare a comprehensive and
participatory national strategy for poverty reduction. Indeed, its experience has inspired
the design of the enhanced HIPC initiative and the PRSP approach. The top leadership in
Uganda is highly committed to poverty reduction; the formulation of Poverty Eradication
Action Plan (PEAP) in 1996-97 was an effort by the executive branch of the government
to make this commitment and vision operational (Republic of Uganda 1996, 1997). This
paper  draws lessons from  the drafting of the PEAP.  The process had  three  specific
features. First, the Plan made extensive use of existing research and data on Uganda to
refocus a whole range of public policy and interventions on poverty reduction. Second,
the government chose a highly participatory approach, with input from central and local
governments, the donor community, NGOs and civil society, and academia. Third, the
govermment  was quick to translate the plan into its budget and medium-term expenditure
framework,  achieving  significant  reallocations  of  public  expenditure  toward  basic
services since the adoption of the PEAP in 1997.
The purpose of this paper is to highlight the two main themes that emerged and
were debated during the 18-month long participatory process: (1) the poverty impact of
macroeconomic and fiscal policy; and (2) the delivery of public services. In addition, the
paper focuses on a third theme which is important to poverty reduction and was nationally
debated in a parallel process but outside the PEAP: (3) poor people's access to productive
assets, particularly land. For each theme, the paper assesses the informational constraints
policymakers typically face in low-income countries, and gives some examples of how to
overcome them.
The  rest  of  the  paper  is  structured as  follows.  Section  2  discusses  general
characteristics  of a poverty reduction action plan, based on the Ugandan experience. Section
3 summarizes the state of knowledge on poverty in the country as well as shortcomings  of
the data. Section 4 looks at macroeconomic and fiscal policies that were considered most
important to poverty reduction during the participatory  process. Section 5 focuses on public
Iservice delivery, particularly basic services that directly affect the poor. Section 6 deals
extensively  with land issues, highlights problems in access to credit and financial services,
and considers security of productive assets. Within each section we consider the existing
state of knowledge and public policy, the reforms debated and prioritized during the PEAP
process to address the needs of the poor more effectively, and issues of implementation.
Finally,  section  7  concludes by  highlighting the  main  controversies that  arose  and
experience in forming a consensus  on priorities for poverty reduction.
2.  What Is a Poverty Reduction Action Plan?
In poor countries with  a central public policy objective of reducing poverty, optimal
policy  would  factor poverty  impacts  into all public-spending  appraisals. In  practice,
policy  typically falls far short of this  description. A poverty reduction  action plan is
essentially a device to make policy more focused on and effective in reducing poverty. It
will usually have implications for policy in all sectors and for the allocation of resources
across sectors.
Within the whole range of public expenditure, some services reach the poor more
directly than  others;  for instance,  services from  village  clinics  and  primary  schools
probably benefit  poor  households more  directly than  services  from  universities  and
hospitals. It is not necessarily the case that the most direct poverty-reducing expenditure
is the most effective in reducing poverty. To model the effects of primary and tertiary
education  on  the  poor  properly  would  involve  general-equilibrium  considerations,
comparing the direct income benefits of primary education with  the effects of tertiary
education on employment-generation and public services, and factoring in the effect of
increased primary  education on the  labor market.  However, in  the  existing  state  of
knowledge, fiscal priorities have to be  guided by  a more approximate judgement.  In
Uganda's  case,  a  judgment  was  made  that  direct  poverty-reducing  services  were
underfunded and needed particular attention. Specific financial mechanisms (such as a
poverty action fund with the budget) were then set up to direct funding toward them, with
dramatic effects. This judgment  is likely to be repeated in many countries because the
political  voice of  the poor  is weak.  If the  concerns of a  poverty reduction  plan  are
restricted solely to the provision of direct poverty-reducing services, or limited to social
sectors, it suggests that the poor need schools and clinics but  not roads,  markets, or
technology. This is obviously not true. Hence a poverty reduction action plan should start
with a broad focus and only identify the areas that require higher priority after assessing
both the needs of the poor and the prospects for economic growth.
This very breadth raises major issues of coverage. For instance, where the sectors of
highest economic  potential differ from those in which the poor are engaged, there is a short-
term, equity-growth tradeoff regarding sectoral emphasis. This tradeoff is less extreme in
Uganda because most of the country has considerable potential for agricultural trade. The
2proportion of the population to be targeted is also an issue. In Uganda, t can be argued that
mass service delivery is a necessary precursor to successful targeting in Uganda, given the
extent of poverty at present and government's limited capacity to target the poor. Although
there is no point in preparing a poverty reduction action plan unless poverty reduction is a
high priority for the government, there will always be government objectives other than
poverty reduction, such as political stability, which may limit the degree of redistribution
that can be achieved. Moreover, some govemments may be committed to poverty reduction
but hostile, in principle,  to redistribution.
To be effective, policies cannot stop, as much of economic analysis does, with the
simple desire to subsidize or deliver a particular good or service, but must attend to the
process of translating this intention into actual delivery.  The process of service delivery may
be as binding a constraint as the shortage of resources. While those doing the technical
analysis need to interact with government, donors, NGOs and civil society more generally,
the reformulation of public policy is bound to be informationally constrained. Nevertheless
the  very process  of  identifying information needs  can help  focus people's  minds.  In
different forms, each of these concerns arises in each sector we examine.
The process of refocusing public policy on poverty in Uganda coincided with a
number  of  other important initiatives. First,  extensive macroeconomic and  marketing
reforms, combined with  some privatizations over  the previous five years, had  greatly
improved the climate  for doing business and the incentive to  export. Second,  a  new
constitution,  promulgated in 1995 after several years of public consultations, culminated in
the Constituent Assembly. A presidential election in  1996, won by the incumbent, led
directly to major policy changes, most notably a public commitment  to provide free primary
education for four children in every family; this resulted in a strong positive response by
households.  Third,  an  ongoing  process  of  decentralization  continued  to  transfer
decisionmaking  to the district level. Fourth, although a civil service reform was in progress,
the more difficult institutional reforms that affect, for example, service delivery and law
enforcement, lagged behind. Fifth,  government initiated a  number of  reforms  which
included: (1) the introduction of  the medium-term expenditure framework into public
budgeting;  (2)  the  preparation of  sectoral plans  in  transport, health,  education, and
agriculture; (3) a reform of the country's agricultural extension service; (4) the preparation
of a land law after a national process of consultation going back several years; and (5) the
introduction of a highly publicized and public scheme for providing  microcredit.
This  highly participatory process involved several stakeholder groups, but  the
formulation of the PEAP did not include direct consultation with the poor. Initially, the
process was conceived as a means for addressing concerns of the vocal NGO community
and the government about the best approaches to poverty reduction. In particular,  NGOs did
not  see much linkage between poverty reduction and the structural adjustment policies
pursued by the government. The PEAP was, therefore, an effort to build consensus among
these parties on the widely differing views on national priorities and, through its several
thematic working groups, to serve as a means for "civic education" on matters of economic
3policy and its linkages with poverty. Given the positive experience from the participatory
process, government subsequently launched direct consultations with groups of ordinary
people on poverty issues (Republic of lJganda 1999). This initiative has contributed to the
revised PEAP, which was completed in the first half of 2000, and has become part of an
evolving strategic framework (Republic of Uganda 2000a).
3.  Knowledge on Poverty and Shortcomings of Data
When the PEAP process was initiated in 1996, macroeconomic data showed high growth
rates  for  the  previous  decade  (real  GDP  growth rate  of 6.5  percent;  3.8 percent  in
agriculture,  11.9  percent  in  industry,  and  7.9  percent  in  services,  on  average).
Nevertheless, there was a widespread perception that this growth was neither translating
into measurable improvements in the  living standards of the majority of Ugandans, nor
leading to any major reduction in poverty (see UNDP 1997). This perception was one of
the reasons for initiating the PEAP.
3.1  Household ecpenditure data
The process of preparing the PEAP revealed major informational gaps on poverty. First,
adequate household survey data were rLot  available to provide a more objective basis for
assessing the impact of the economic reform program on poverty and inequality over time.
The 1989 household budget survey, which was conducted for obtaining a new base for the
consumer  price  index,  used  a  different  sampling  method  from  the  first  nationally
representative household  survey of  1S992.  This  made comparison of  consumption  and
poverty between the two surveys impossible (Appleton 1996a). Furthermore, survey data
collected after 1992 were not available for analysis due to lack of statistical capacity to
clean  and  archive such data, which prompted a  concerted effort by  the Bank  and  the
government to build capacity in this area. Consequently, five consecutive surveys became
available in 1999 covering the period of 1992-97/98, each consisting of a large sample of
households  (typically 5,000;  10,000 in  1992) and communities  (typically around  500;
1,000 in  1992). These surveys offer much better data for analyzing changes in poverty
and inequality in response to economic reforms.
Despite the lack of time series data during the drafting of the PEAP,  the  1992
integrated household survey provided a useful cross-sectoral poverty profile (World Bank
1996a). According to the profile, poverty in Uganda is mainly rural, both because the urban
share of the population is small and because the rural areas are poorer than the urban ones.
Poverty also has a strong regional component; it is much higher in the North and, to a lesser
extent, in the East, than in the West and Central regions (there is no "south" because the
southern parts of all three regions border Lake Victoria). Sectorally, cash crop farmers were
as poor as the rest of the population in 1992. Households with little access to land were
poorer; and most rural households depended mainly on agricultural production either for
4subsistence or for the market. Food was a substantial proportion of expenditure throughout
the expenditure distribution, suggesting how poor the country really was after the collapse
in incomes in the 1970s  and 1980s.'
The household survey data for 1992-97/98, which became available in 1999, filled
the long-time gap in poverty data. The surveys show that mean incomes did indeed rise
significantly during that period, combined with an overall improvement in  inequality as
measured by the Gini coefficient (Appleton  2000a). This overall improvement reflects both
the sharp increase in coffee prices in 1994, which was passed on to producers under the
newly  liberalized regime,  and  some  change  in  economic  structure  as  the  share  of
households in cash cropping increased. A decomposition analysis shows that almost one-
half of the improvement in poverty during this period was due to improvement in the
conditions of cash crop farmers.
Using an absolute poverty line based on calorie needs given the typical diet of the
Ugandan poor and minimum nonfood requirements,  figure 1 shows 56 percent of Ugandans
were poor in 1992, and 44 percent were poor in 1997/98 (Appleton 2000a). These relatively
high figures illustrate the low base from which Uganda's recovery has started and that mass
poverty still exists. For the purposes of comparing poverty trends over time, however, the
result of falling poverty was found to hold, whatever poverty line was chosen. The fall in
poverty-more  than 20 percent-is  substantial, given the relatively short interval of five
years, and is explained  mostly by income growth and only to a limited extent by changes in
the distribution of welfare (figure 2).
The reduction in poverty was not uniform across all regions or economic sectors,
or the same for each year. The incidence of poverty fell most in the Central region and
least in the Eastern region, and economically, households engaged in cash crop farming,
manufacturing,  and trade fared  particularly well. Poverty declined in every region between
1992/93 and 1997/98; nationally, it also declined between every survey. The only group
to experience worsening poverty over the survey period was households that reported a
nonworking head. Such households could be headed by the elderly, children, or disabled.
This finding strengthens the general impression that while economic recovery has created
opportunities that many households were able to seize, transfer mechanisms for targeting
the households that are not able to  do so, do not work. While private remittances are
important (for example, more than 20 percent of household income for the poorest quartile
in 1992), alone they are inadequate  to lift these vulnerable  households out of poverty.
' For the poorest  86 percent of households the share of spending on food was around 68 percent in
1992,  for the  next  10 percent  of  households  it was 65 percent,  and  for  the  rest  (only  4 percent  of
households) it was 51 percent (World Bank 1996a).
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6Appleton (2000a) finds a greater rise in living standards for the lower (poorer) deciles.
The rise in consumption per adult equivalent is 27 percent at the bottom decile, 23
percent at the second decile, and 21 percent for the third poorest decile in 1992/93-
1997/98. Disaggregating into rural and urban areas, the distributional pattern in rural
areas is very close to that in the country as a whole (though the mean is consistently
lower). Using the median expenditure, Appleton shows that urban living standards have
risen faster than rural ones. As in rural areas, there is some tendency for urban
consumption to rise more at the lower deciles. The finding  that urban living standards have
risen is unsurprising, given the national account indicators of strong nonagricultural sector
performance and visible progress in the major towns. Nevertheless,  it is interesting that the
rise in rural welfare is comparable  with and even more consistent than the rise in urban
areas.
3.2 Participatory poverty assessment
The second shortcoming in poverty data in 1996 was the lack of qualitative or nonmoney
metric information on poverty. It was not until after the PEAP process was completed and
the government had gained some capacity in and exposure to participatory methods, that it
was able to address this constraint. A national participatory poverty assessment is currently
being carried out  in  collaboration with  donors and NGOs. The Uganda  Participatory
Poverty Assessment Project (UPPAP) is a 3-phase process, in which the perspectives of
the poor are being brought into national and district policy formulation, planning, and
implementation. The first phase consulted people in  36 rural and urban  sites  in nine
districts.
Local people described poverty as a lack of the means to satisfy basic material and
social needs, as well as a feeling of powerlessness (Republic of Uganda 1999). Poverty is
viewed as nonuniform, complex, multidimensional, cyclic and seasonal and is described
by more than one hundred  indicators. For example, a poor household is  a household
without productive assets, income, and necessities. A poor community is a community
without adequate basic services and infrastructure, livelihood opportunities, or without
adequate security.  Certain  groups are perceived as  more vulnerable to  poverty  than
others: the  landless,  casual  laborers, women,  widows,  widows  and  widowers  with
children, orphans and neglected children, the youth and the elderly, the chronically sick,
and the displaced and refugees. While considerably extending these concepts of poverty
beyond  private  consumption,  these  finding  are  surprisingly  consistent  with  the
quantitative household survey evidence.
When assessing poverty trends, however, perception data collected by the UPPAP
are at odds with the quantitative survey evidence discussed above. The UPPAP report
concludes:
7"Through analysis of long-term trends in poverty, many local people felt
that poverty was worsening in their communities... Local people reported
more movement into poverty than out of it." (Republic of Uganda 1999)
The difference between the participatory findings and the surveys can be interpreted
in a number of ways. McGee (2000) offers the following  hypotheses. First, the participatory
surveys use a different reference period, so that poverty may be being compared with the
period of the  1960s. Secondly, the participatory survey is not based on a representative
sample. A third explanation may be  that the income gains have been concentrated on
households which can grow cash crops; for the majority of households who do not grow
these crops, the income gains have been significantly smaller. Fourthly, the introduction of
cost-sharing might have increased the needs of households for cash; in principle, the CPI
should pick this effect up. Fifthly, the participatory results confirm the claim that has been
made elsewhere inside and outside Uganda that increased incomes from cash crops may
sometimes come at the expense of reduced area cultivated for food, increasing local food
prices or directly reducing the availability of home-produced food. Finally, the national
statistical surveys do not adequately capture insecure areas. 2 Where insecurity prevents the
collection of data, the area affected is omitted from the sample for the relevant year and for
any year to which is compared. If increases in insecurity are correlated over time with
increases in poverty, then this procedure will tend to bias the comparison in favor of the
year which is  experiencing greater insecurity, to  an unknown degree. The number  of
internally displaced households and refugees has recently been estimated at over a million,
compared to a population of somewhat over twenty million, so this effect is by no means
negligible. Certainly, the participatory surveys found that various forms of insecurity were
central to the experience  of poverty.
All of these hypotheses deserve fiurther  investigation.  However, rather than in poverty
trends the strength of the participatory approach is probably in  its exploration of fine-
grained aspects of welfare  which  quantitative studies  will not  identify  (though,  once
identified, they can often be studied quantitatively). For instance, the surveys in Uganda
shed  light on the relative strengths and weaknesses of different legal  institutions and
different levels of law enforcement, and on the factors which deterred people from using
medical services (among which the unpredictability  of costs was as important as the level of
costs).
2 The four districts  excluded  from the quantitative  analysis due to security  included 6.9 percent of
Uganda's population.  The omission  raises mean consumption  by  1.8 percent in the 1992/93  household
survey  (Appleton  2000a).
83.3  Other shortcomings
The third informational gap was agricultural production data. Apart from  the  1992/93
integrated household survey the subsequent surveys did not adequately cover households'
production, which is the backbone of the economy. In particular, smallholder agriculture
suffers from inadequate information about production, input use, and so forth. This gap in
information will only be remedied when the national household survey is completed in
2000.
Table 1: Social  Indicators
1988/89  1995
Life  expectancy  49  43
Infant  mortality  119  97
Immunization  (%, 12-23 months)  31  49
Malnutrition  (%,  stunting)  43  39
No Education  (%)
Female,  15-19  years  21  19
Male,  15-19  years  n/a  7
Net enrollment  age 6-10  (%)  47  64
Gross  enrollment  P7 (%)  n/a  45
Males  n/a  55
Female  n/a  35
Literacy  (%/O)  54  61
Female  45  49
n/a not  available.
Note:  Literacy  and  enroHment  figures  are  not  fully  comparable  between  years.
Source:  Demographic  and  Health  Survey,  1995;  Integrated  Household  Survey  1992/93;  World  Bank  Atlas.
Fourth, it was difficult to construct exact data on the budgetary commitments and
actual spending regionally or on poverty-related programs. This informational gap both
reflects and contributes to problems in public sector management. Given such systemic
difficulties  in  public  information  systems,  a  diagnostic  survey  was  carried  out
simultaneously  with the PEAP process to explore actual financing of primary schools and
health  clinics  across the  country. As  discussed below,  this  survey proved  useful  in
pinpointing specific problems policymakers could tackle. Similarly, there are shortages of
data on the output of some critical government services. Where there is data, different
sources often conflict as demonstrated by the divergent trends between official primary
enrollment statistics and survey-based data (for details see section 5). A great deal of work
is needed to improve the amount, type, and quality of public spending related data collected.
Thanks to the 1995 demographic and health survey (DHS) and a similar survey in
1988/89, information on health-related  human development indicators was available for the
PEAP process; however, several other social indicators were not available or the data were
9of  poor  quality  (particularly school  enrollment data).  The DHS  estimated that  child
mortality was 176 per thousand in the early 1980s and 147 per thousand in the early 1990s.
Levels under 200 were obtained in the mid-1960s, but the decline in incomes and health
services during the period of economric  and social decay in  1971-85 prevented further
progress until the mid-1980s. Child rnortality partially reflects educational level and the
information households have about health (Mackinnon 1995). In addition, AIDS mortality
has been high, so that life expectancy has fallen dramatically in recent years (see Table 1).
According to data in the 1995 DHS, a vigorous public information campaign successfully
increased awareness of the causes of HIV  infection, and prevalence has begun  to  fall
nationally.
4. Macroeconomic and Fiscal Policy
Major components of macroeconomic reform in Uganda have been fiscal stabilization and
trade,  foreign  exchange,  and  financial  liberalization.  These  policies  have  been
complemented by privatization of public enterprises and reforms in taxation and public
expenditures.
4.1 The effects of reform on poverty
The reforms have increased economic growth, although per capita income has not
quite yet regain its pre-1970 levels. Macroeconomic  policy is clearly the strongest element
in Uganda's recovery to date. In the PEAP process, which focused on building consensus
on the importance of maintaining macro stability and analyzing key linkages between
economic policies and poverty, the main issues were as follows:
Price stabilization. Since price stabilization  was achieved in 1992 inflation has been
in the single digits. The key instrumenrt  for maintaining macroeconomic stability is fiscal
restraint. Conquering high inflation is unambiguously beneficial to the poor, whose assets
are disproportionately in cash and who typically do not have the means for hedging against
inflation by shifting into real assets. The effects of the inflation tax on poverty can be
thought about in two ways. The first is the static incidence of the tax. While the poor are
likely to have  low ratios of financial wealth to income, they also have high  ratios of
nonindexed assets in their financial assets, making the overall incidence uncertain. The
second is the dynamic effect of the tax. Unlike other taxes, inflation taxes specifically tax
savings, thereby discouraging financial accumulation  and perpetuating poverty.
Relative price  changes. The  impact of the  relative price changes needs  to  be
assessed. The objective of the liberalization policy has been to increase the relative price of
traded exports with respect to food cr'ops and nontradable goods. The intention was to
reverse the dramatic decline in the production of export commodities during the 1970s and
1980s. This policy has been successful. The group that has most clearly benefited from this
policy is households that grow traditional export crops, particularly coffee. In the  1992
10survey,  such households  were about  as likely  to be poor as others,  and the poor derived  as
large  a share  of income  from such  crops as the nonpoor.  Findings  from the 1997/98  survey,
however,  suggest  that households  growing  traditional  export crops (coffee,  tea, cotton,  and
tobacco)  are now  better off than the average  (Appleton  2000a).  Increased  trade and export
of maize and beans, which are new as export crops, provide some potential to reach
households  in the poorer  Eastern  region.
The increased  relative price of traditional  cash crops is reflected  in a rise in their
share in the total value of national  crop output from 7 to 13 percent in 1992 and 1995,
respectively  (Okidi 1999).  The largest increase  of 20 percentage  points (from 13 to 33
percent  between 1992  and 1995)  occurred  in the Central  region,  which is a coffee  growing
area, followed  by the Eastern  region  where  the share of cash crops increased  from 7 to 12
percent.
A substantial  shift away from subsistence  agriculture  (from about 35 percent of
GDP in 1985 to about 20 percent of GDP in 1999) toward marketable  agriculture  also
occurred.  At the household  level, the average  share of marketed  output to total output
increased  from 19 to 22 percent nationally  during the 1992-95 period (Okidi 1999).  Cash
crop production  of cotton, groundnuts,  and sesame,  the most suitable  crops for the North,
declined.  As a result, the sales-output  ratio declined  in the North by 3 percentage  points
during  the same  period,  which is consistent  with the finding  that  the region had the lowest
regional  growth  rate of mean household  income.  However,  preliminary  evidence  from the
1999/2000  national household  survey indicates  that cotton growing has recovered since
then. Proximity  to tarred roads and a bank (or moneylender)  significantly  increases  the
chances  that a household  sells at least  20 percent  of its crop as output.
The distributional  effects  of liberalization,  therefore,  have been generally  neutral or
positive across  Uganda,  except  for the North,  which is the poorest  region.  Public services,
such as agricultural extension and transport infrastructure,  play an important role in
ensuring  that the poor can participate  in the expanding  sector. In the North problems  in
service  delivery  have  been made  more  difficult  by conflict.
One important  caveat  is the extent  to which commercialization  in Uganda  benefits
men  at women's expense.  Men  are more  likely  than  women  to control  the income  from cash
crops.  A study in Arua found that women  disliked  having  to work on tobacco  and felt that
they would  be better  off without  the crop (Harmsworth  1991).  In some  cash-crop  growing
areas  health workers  observe  that malnourished  children  are likely  to come from cash-crop
producing  households.  Nevertheless,  the existence  of gender  inequality  and the control of
income  by men does not necessarily  exclude  women from pursuing  new opportunities  to
generate income; this depends on the way the household  responds. Mackinnon (1998)
examines  household  behavior and finds that women may benefit relatively more from
increases  in domestic  productivity  than  increases  in cash crop  prices;  nevertheless,  the claim
that they  actually  lose in absolute  terms  from  increases  in cash crop  prices  is much stronger.
During the PEAP discussions,  it was felt that female  bargaining  power could better be
promoted  by improving  girls' and women's access  to public  services  and ownership  rights
11than  by  reducing  retums  to  the  most  promising economic option  facing many  rural
households.
Movements in the real exchange have, during some periods, restricted improvement
in the position of traded goods. Uganda's external position was strengthened by number of
events: (1) a major inflow from the global coffee price boom of 1994 (including an inflow
during 1994 into Rwanda through Ugarnda);  (2) an increases in coffee production, following
the coffee boom in 1994-95; (3) a strong recovery in remittances from abroad boosted by
increased confidence; (4) and aid flows, which remained the same or increased slightly in
real terms. 3 The appreciation in combination with poor weather did significant damage to
some producers of noncoffee exports, particularly maize. This induced severe distress in the
Eastern part of the country. Poverty trends during the period suggest a worsening in the East
during 1994 (Appleton 2000a). The possible conflict between the effect of aid on the real
exchange rate and the promotion of better incentives for traded goods remains a policy
dilemma in many African economies, but its empirical quantification is usually difficult
(Elbadawi 1999).
4.2 An agenda for  macroeconomic andfiscalpolicy
The benefits of promoting agricultural exports for growth are considerable, and the most
important priority for poverty eradication is to support this growth and ensure that the poor
can benefit from it. The agenda for macroeconomic and fiscal policies laid out in the PEAP
reflects this vision. While macroeconomic policy was largely endorsed as is, fiscal policy
regarding taxation and spending for public services was reevaluated.
4.2.1 Tradepolicy
As mentioned earlier, trade liberalization has been a cornerstone of the Ugandan economic
reform program in the past decade, resulting in one of the most open trade regimes in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Import  liberalization started in  earnest in  the  mid-1990s.  The  PEAP
reiterated  government's  commitment to  reduce  the  antiexport bias  and  refrain  from
protecting a  few jobs  in urban areas at the expense of the majority of rural consumers.
Given that Ugandan producers are price-takers in the world market but domestically have
(at least some) market power, the final burden (incidence) of import duties largely falls on
exporters of coffee, cotton, tea, and fish, which are often produced by poor households. By
1999, non-COMESA import duties had been reduced to  15, 7 and 0 percent (consumer
goods, raw materials and capital goods, respectively), while regional duties are even lower. 4
All remaining import bans have been abolished. However, a recent firm survey indicated
3 Subsequently,  Uganda's external public debt service obligations  became lighter, following the
Highly  Indebted  Poor  Country  (HIPC)  initiatives  in 1998  and 2000.
4  Except for a 10-percent  surcharge  on a large number  of goods that compete  with imnports  from the
neighboring  countries  which  maintain  higher  regional  tariffs  on such  goods.
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1999). Efforts are being made to find new ways (using commercial banks, for example) to
improve the duty drawback system.
4.2.2  Tax reform
The rebuilding of  government's  revenue base  from  an  almost total collapse  has been
another important feature of  Uganda's  economic recovery. Institution building  for tax
administration was given priority. As  a result, domestic revenue has increased from 7.6
percent of monetary GDP in 1986 to  14.7 percent in 1998. Tax policy and incidence of
taxation, however, had received much less attention. When the PEAP was being drafted
little information existed on actual tax burdens (that is, who was affected and by  how
much). Therefore the PEAP mainly  emphasizes key principles of poverty-sensitive tax
policy, recognizing that such a policy needs to address both efficiency and equity. Priority
was given to reforming the existing tax system to broaden the income base, phasing out
discriminatory exemptions, and making the tax system more progressive.
In recent years government has indeed taken a number of measures to achieve a
more efficient and equal tax regime. Exemptions have been reduced, a VAT was introduced
in  1996, and  an  income  tax  reform was  implemented in  1997. Subsequently, more
information on the incidence of taxation has also become available. A study based on the
1992 integrated household survey found that a reform to replace the sales tax with a VAT
would make the poor better  off (Chen, Matovu  and Reinikka 2000). When selectively
implemented by a zero rating on the commodities consumed by the poor, the VAT is found
to be a progressive tax. Import duties are also found to have become more progressive over
time, indicating that the use of differentiated duties tends to be more regressive than more
uniform rates. Fuel  is generally more highly taxed in Uganda than in the  neighboring
countries. Although lower than other petroleum products, taxes on paraffin tend to be very
regressive. In  the PEAP  the government committed  itself to  reviewing  fuel taxation.
Similarly, export taxes are regressive, particularly the stabilization tax on coffee which was
re-introduced in 1994 but later abolished.
The most important local tax is the graduated personal tax (GPT) which is assessed
and collected as a presumptive tax on almost all tax subjects in the rural areas and the self-
employed in the urban areas. According to a 1994 survey, GPT accounts for between 18
and 40 percent of locally raised revenue for municipalities and 60 to 85 percent for the
districts. It is almost certainly regressive as everyone with an income below U Sh 840,000
(US$560) per  year pays the same amount, eliminating any correction for income.  The
reform of the GPT was called for in the PEAP, to be focussed on reducing its regressiveness
and simplifying its administration and collection, which is at present arbitrary and costly.
Little progress has been made in this area to date.
Finally, before  1997 small firms did not pay  regular income taxes unless they
opted to do so, but following the 1997 income tax reform, a presumptive tax of up to 1
percent is now levied on their gross turnover. Since the presumptive tax is imposed on the
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initial allowance for investment in machinery, nor subject to any restrictions  regarding
writing off business  expenditure. As  a result, the marginal effective tax rate for small
firms  is  lower  than  that  for  large  and  medium-sized  firms  on  all  other  assets  but
machinery (Chen and Reinikka 1999). Most small firms also pay the municipal property
tax, which constitute most of their actual tax burden.
4.2.3  Spending on basic services
At the time of drafting the PEAP it was estimated that only 23 percent of total recfrrent
public expenditure (including recurrent:  components of donor projects) was spent on four
basic services delivered mostly by local governments (primary education, primary health,
agricultural extension and feeder road rnaintenance). The government made a commitment
to increase the share of expenditure to 50 percent, but no target date was set for achieving
this goal. While the Constitution calls for three types of intergovernmental grants, only two
were operational in 1997: the block grant and the conditional grant. Equalization grants for
poorer districts are now being introduced. The regional inequality in Uganda provides a
good argument for such interventions, but because political divisions reflect regional ones,
it has been important to develop a technical set of criteria for these grants.
In 1998, in the context of the medium-term expenditure framework the government
introduced a Poverty Action Fund which is ultimately intended to include all spending on
directly poverty-reducing public  services. This  includes  government  spending,  donor
budget support, and some donor projects in cases where these are well integrated into the
government's  sectoral plans. Government and donors are now focusing on the share of
spending going to the programs included in the PAF, which has increased substantially
since 1997. As a share of government-funded expenditure, PAF programs are expected to
increase from 23 percent in  1998/99 to 33 percent in 2002/03. This  spending is more
carefully monitored, with strong civil society involvement; 5 percent of the PAF is devoted
to accountability. Government ministries seeking increases in funding now recognize that
the most promising line of attack is to argue that their spending should qualify for PAF; this
ensures that decisions about fiscal allocation involve discussions about poverty impact.
Under the terms of the decentralization  program the districts now deliver most of
the services considered as high-priority for the poor. The fiscal implications of delivering
these services are discussed in the next section. One important dimension is the regional
profile of expenditure.
5. Public Services
Rather than examining the whole range of public services, the PEAP process focused on
services that  interact directly with  the  lives of  the poor  and  hence  are priorities  for
poverty oriented public spending. Six major services were included:
14*  primary education
*  a basic package  of medical  care
*  agricultural  extension
*  transport
*  water supply
*  basic legal services.
While the desirability  of people getting each of these services is widely accepted,  who
should provide them and how are controversial.  We therefore consider the following
aspects:
5.1 The case  for public services:  market  failure and equity
As terminology  in this area differs, it is necessary  to define a few key concepts For
example,  inefficiency  in public service  delivery  was taken to mean that there are services
which people value at more than their cost but which are not being delivered  because of
market and/or  government  failure.  Equity  refers to the total distribution  of welfare across
society,  including  the utilization  of public  services,  but also  the distribution  of real income.
In this sense equity  can be improved  not only when the poor get better access  to a service
from which they  were previously  excluded,  but also when the price the poor are paying is
reduced  for a given  service.  In Uganda,  government  spending  is seriously  constrained,  and
asset inequality  is difficult  to address  directly.  Hence  public spending  needs to be soundly
based  on at least  one of these  criteria,  and  preferably  both.
The standard method of prioritizing  different forms of public spending is by
comparing  rates of return. In principle  (for instance  in the framework  of Stern and Drbze
1990), such calculations should include income distributional effects, the  extent of
substitution  between  public and private sectors;  and an estimate  of external  effects,  but in
practice most estimates  neglect all three aspects of the impact of public services. For
poverty  reduction,  this point is critical.  For instance,  tertiary  education  does very little for
poverty reduction directly even if  it has high private returns, because its returns go
overwhelmingly  to the nonpoor.  Indirectly,  tertiary  education  may have very significant
benefits for poverty reduction if  graduates contribute to  better public services or
employment  generation,  remit their incomes to poor households,  or contribute to  the
communities  they come from. But there are no estimates  available  of these externalities.
Moreover,  the forms  of benefit  that are produced  by public  services  are diverse  and hard to
compare.  Consider,  for instance,  the valuation  of income  streams,  lives  saved  by health and
education,  labor  and effort  saved  by improved  water supplies,  and births  prevented  by birth
control. Measurement  of these competing  benefits,  given the current state of the art, is
sensitive  to assumptions  that are quite difficult  to justify, even approximately.  Hence,  the
intersectoral  allocation  inevitably  depends  on judgment as much as quantitative  analysis.
Within  sectors,  the implications  of quantitative  analysis  are often  more  clear-cut.
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following: (1) that there are positive returns to some services, (2) the extent to which the
public or the private sectors are already delivering the service and their respective efficacy,
and (3) the incidence of expenditure within the sector. In the latter the benefit is proxied by
its cost. In the next sections, we will establish the Ugandan information base by sector in
these three aspects.
5.2 Public expenditures
Public expenditure data in Uganda suffers from many problems: coverage, misclassification
of recurrent  and  capital expenditure, administration versus  facility distinction, lack  of
disaggregation  by  appropriate  program,  and  lack  of  actual  spending  data  due  to
decentralization. Coverage has been greatly improved by the integration of donor-funded
spending in the Public Investment Plarn.  The development budget includes much recurrent
spending but an attempt has been made to disaggregate it. The recurrent-capital distinction
is important not because recurrent spending is "consumption"-much  recurrent spending
can  be  understood  as  a  form  of  investment, including  health,  education, agricultural
extension, and infrastructure maintenailce-but  because recurrent spending represents the
kind  of  spending needed to  keep a  given public  service that  is often underprioritized
functioning reliably.
The distinction between administration and service delivery is not clearly made in
the accounts and, as noted above, it turned out in 1996 that much spending intended for
schools never passes beyond the level of the district education office. The development
budget is disaggregated by program, but the recurrent budget is not detailed enough for this;
payroll data, for instance, do not clearly distinguish staff by category, making the functional
classification of  spending  unclear. Finally, the Ministry  of  Finance was  relying  on  a
"shadow budget," assuming what the districts should be spending on basic services, rather
than using either budgets or actuals fromn  the district levels. As a result, the spending which
is most  directly related to  the lives of the poor is the spending which  is known  least
accurately.
A  lesson  of  the  experience vvas that  specific  requests  for  existing  budgetary
information need to be made early in the process. The categorizations  of interest for poverty
reduction are not necessarily available and may be laborious to extract, but the request for
information helps  to  focus attention on  the  subsectors of  importance. The  returns  to
commissioning specific studies on aspects of public expenditure can be high. For example,
the results of expenditure tracking produced a change in the administrative mechanisms
used to transmit funds to schools within one year.
It is sometimes suggested that the best way to assess the extent to which needs are
being met, is to add private spending to public spending and compare it to some norm.
There are two potentially serious problems with this approach. One is that the cost structure
and efficiency of spending may vary widely between public and private sectors. The other is
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really  delivering  services  to the poor.  In Uganda,  for instance,  the proportion  of poor people
among  users  of public  health  services  is higher  than that among  users of private  services  at
the primary  level (Appleton  and Mackinnon  1995).  Where  private  expenditures  are highly
unequal, a volume of expenditure,  which is in aggregate  adequate,  will not ensure that
everyone's  needs  are met.
One form of private  sector  spending,  however,  may  play a critical  role in supporting
the access  of the poorest to services:  NGOs.  While  data are not available  at an aggregate
level,  it is important  to realize  that  the public  sector figures  include  some  projects  under the
government's  investment  plan  in which  money  is channeled  from  donors  to NGOs.
5.3 Primary education
Even though  enrollment  is an apparently  simple  concept  to define  and measure,  in the mid-
1990s the gross primary enrollment rates defined by  the household survey and the
administrative  records were about 90  and 70 percent, respectively.  This remarkable
discrepancy  was partly because  the mean number  of days reported  missed during the past
30 days in the household  survey  was about  2.5, roughly  10  percent of the intended  days of
school; partly because the administration's  figures did not include private schools; and
partly because there were other (unspecified)  problems  with the administrative  system
which recorded  primary enrollment  data. The latter was confirmed  by the school survey
undertaken  as part of the PEAP  process  (Reinikka  2000).  Namely,  while official  enrollment
figures remained stagnant throughout  the first half of the 1990s, the survey of schools
showed  an increase  of 60 percent  in primary  enrollment  in 1991-95  (see details  below).
5.3.1 Returns to education
In primary education  sources  of market failure  include the following:  (1) the inability of
parents  to capture  returns  from their  children's  education,  (2) the difficulty  of borrowing  on
the strength  of future  incomes,  (3) externalities,  and (4) a possible  misperception  about  the
value of education.  For instance, it has been suggested  that people underestimate  the
benefits of parental information  about health, which can be promoted by  education.
However,  a women's needs assessment  survey  in Uganda  found that mothers  wanted  their
daughters  educated  because  it would  make them 'better mothers'.  In Uganda,  Appleton  and
Balihuta  (1996)  have studied  the effects  of education  on productivity.  In contrast  to most
studies in Africa, the data relate to rural households  and incomes from farmiing  and
productivity,  not merely  wages  earned  in urban  employment.  Returns  were positive  though
not spectacularly  high. One unusual feature of this study was to estimate externalities,
which found externalities  to be larger that the direct benefits of education.  Mackinnon
(1995) examines  health outcomes  and finds that parental education  has a very powerful
impact  on child  survival.
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each year of education, earnings increase by about 4 percent (Appleton 2000b). This is a
modest benefit although it may still imply a high rate of return if the opportunity costs of
attending primary school are low. Perhaps the most surprising finding is that education
has  similar  proportional  productive  benefits  in  all  three  income-generating  activities:
farming, non-farm  self-employment,  and  wage  employment. This  is  what  one  might
expect if human capital was allocated efficiently across activities. However, it does run
contrary  to  the  common  belief-and  much  supporting  evidence-that  education  is
rewarded more in wage employment and brings only small returns in farming. Appleton
suggests that the relatively small returns to education conventionally found in agricultural
production functions may partly arise from a failure to properly control for the input of
labor to farming. The results imply that education may bring tangible benefits to the poor
in Uganda, who are typically not wage employees.
It  is worth noting, in this context, that the general equilibrium effects will also
differ across sectors. Assuming diminishing returns to a single factor of production,  an
expanded supply of primary education will tend to drive down returns to education from
wage employment by compressing the educated-uneducated differential. But it need not
reduce returns to education in cash crcip  production or food production (though it might
have some effect through food markets). The abundance of agricultural land in Uganda
suggests that if education does raise productivity, there should be abundant opportunities
for farmers to exploit these returns.
Appleton  also  estimates  the  extent  to  which  education  brings  returns  by
reallocating labor rather than by direct productivity benefits. Once again, the results are
somewhat  surprising.  It  was  expected that  a  principal  indirect  benefit  of  secondary
education  would  be  increased  access  to  wage  employment.  However,  in  the
decompositions,  this benefit was wholly  offset by the loss of  income associated  with
withdrawal  from  farming and non-farm self-employment. Indeed, the combined  entry
effect and labor allocation effects of secondary education were  estimated to be  mildly
negative. By contrast, an important channel through which primary education appears to
benefit households is in encouraging entry to non-farm income generating activities and
reallocating labor out of fanning.
More  generally, the consensus that returns  to  education are higher in  primary
education than in other levels has been recently challenged. In a number of African cases,
urban  workers  show  higher  returns  for  higher  levels  of  education using  Mincerian
coefficients (see  Mincer  1974 for  the definition). Nevertheless, translating Mincerian
coefficients into  rates of  return requires cost  information, and  assumptions  about  life
expectancy and the future behavior of earnings. For example, Mason and Khandker (1997)
give high estimates for  labor foregone by  children attending school in  rural Tanzania.
However, survey evidence from Uganda does not confirm this finding (Appleton 2000b),
but shows that school fees are the main reason for both never attending school and dropping
out  (over 50  and 60  percent of  respondents, respectively). Contrary to  evidence from
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need to work was only 5 percent, the same as for the highest quintile (World Bank 1996b).
These differences may reflect methodology rather than a  difference between the  two
countries.
5.3.2  Service delivery in education
The service delivery surveys typically examine the effects of policies or interventions on
households and their demand for and perceptions of the quality of services. Inputs and
outputs on the supply side, such as the flow of public funds and school enrollment fates,
are left for official statistics or administrative records. However, a survey can provide a
useful  reality check on the  supply side  of service delivery when  institutions  operate
suboptimally and official statistics are lacking or are of poor quality.
The principal motivation for an expenditure tracking survey, which was carried
out in the context of the PEAP, was the observation that while budgetary allocations for
primary  education  almost  tripled  between  1991  and  1995,  there  was  hardly  any
corresponding  increase  in  the  officially  reported  enrollment  (Reinikka  2000).  The
hypothesis  was that  actual service delivery  (output) was much worse than budgetary
allocations  would  imply  because  public  funds  (inputs)  did  not  reach  the  intended
facilities.  Reasons  why  facilities  may  not  receive  the  allocated  funds  range  from
competing priorities at various levels of govermment  to corruption and misuse of public
funds. To test this hypothesis, budget allocations and actual spending were compared in
two  decentralized  sectors,  primary  education and  health  care.  As  local  government
accounts were not generally available, a survey of 19 out of Uganda's  39 districts was
carried out, including 250 government schools and 100 public health clinics, to collect
spending data  for  1991-95.5 Interestingly, local government (district)  and health  unit
records were totally inadequate, while school records were relatively good.
The school survey confirmed the hypothesis that input flows suffer from serious
problems  which,  to  a  large  extent,  have  to  do  with  poor  governance  and  lack  of
accountability. On average, less than 20 percent of funding intended for nonsalary public
spending actually reached the schools in  1991-95, as district authorities kept and used
most of the nonsalary capitation (per student) grant meant for schools. Similarly, at best,
schools were allowed to keep only one-third of mandatory tuition fees from parents; the
rest went to  district education offices. There were also large variations: at the median
school retention of both the capitation grant and tuition fees was zero.
Compared to nonsalary expenditures, tracking teachers'  salaries was complicated
by the absence of disaggregated central government pay data. By and large, salaries seem
to reach the schools much better than nonwage allocations, however with considerable
In 1997  there  were approximately  10,000  primary  schools  in Uganda;  15  percent  were private  and the
rest were  government  schools.
19delay. The only systematic way of misappropriating salary fumds were "ghosts"  on the
payroll. Previous actions by the government to clean up the teachers'  payroll give some
idea of the magnitude of the leakage iri salaries: close to 20 percent of all teachers on the
payroll were removed as ghosts in 1993.
The survey also unearthed a host of other features of service delivery that were
quite unexpected but nonetheless critical to the functioning of the education services and
hence to any intervention in these sectors. First, contrary to the stagnation in enrollment
rates indicated by  officially reported figures, the school survey reported  an increase  in
primary enrollment of 60 percent in 15991-95.  Such a stunning discrepancy indicates that
official statistics cannot always be trusted. Second, although the government's  share of
the total expenditure on public primary education increased over time, the bulk of the
burden continued to be borne by parents who, on average, contributed over 70 percent of
total school spending in  1991 and 60 percent in 1995 (40 and 20 percent at the median
school, respectively). Parents'  contributions over the survey period continued to increase
in real terms despite higher public spending.
While many of the survey findings were rather troubling, there is a positive side to
the  story. Following  the release of  survey results  in  1996, the  government responded
actively  to  them.  For  example, to  increase  transparency  and  accountability  monthly
transfers  of public  funds to  districts  are now reported  in  the major  newspapers  and
broadcast on radio. Moreover, government policy now requires that transfers to primary
education be displayed on public notice boards in each school and district center, and the
Ministry of Education monitors compliance. School-based procurement has replaced the
central supply of construction  and other materials, and data on spending  on teacher's
salaries are now available at the central government level.
The Ministry  of  Education replicated the  school  survey  four  years  later.  The
results indicate dramatic improvements'  in the flow of funds (Republic of Uganda 2000b).
Instead of only 20 percent in 1995, schools received close to 100 percent of the capitation
(per student) grants  1998/99 on average and close to 90 percent  at the median  school.
This experience demonstrates that information can be a powerful tool of change in a weak
institutional setting.
5.3.3 Incidence of expenditure
The rationale of an incidence study is to determine the distribution of public  spending,
that is, the extent to which different income groups (expenditure quintiles in this  case)
benefit from public expenditure. This is important as effective public service delivery can
contribute a great deal to poverty reduction. The incidence analysis is useful in signaling
distributional problems, but  it cannot provide all necessary  answers on how to  solve
them.  Hence, the  next step  would  be  to  derive the  determinants  of  demand  for  the
services  in  question  or  other  behavioral relationships  required  for  informed  policy
decisions. For example, if one finds that the poor do not use public services, this may be a
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quality  (supply). Further,  the benefit  in  this  approach is  measured by its  cost,  which
obviously is less than a perfect measure of many benefits, immunization for example.
An incidence analysis was carried out during the PEAP process. The study was
based  upon  data  from  the  1992/93  integrated  household  survey  (IHS)  and  the
government's  fiscal  accounts  to  assess  the  extent  to  which  public  expenditure  on
education benefits the poor  (World Bank  1996b). A summary of  findings in  primary
education include the following:
*  Net  enrollment rates among the bottom quintile were very  low. In  1992/93 the
rate  was  46  percent  at  the  primary  level  compared  to  81  percent  for  top
expenditure quintile.
*  The average education benefit per capita was very small, that is, U Sh 1,896 for
primary schools.
*  The bottom quintile's  share of the total primary education benefit was almost the
same  as  for  the  top  quintile  because  the  higher  enrollment  rates  in  richer
households  are offset by  a higher proportion of  school-age children  in  poorer
households.  At  the  secondary  level  only  a  fraction  (4  percent)  of  the  total
education benefit accrued to the bottom quintile, while the top quintile got nearly
half (49 percent). The,  benefit in secondary education is not at all targeted toward
the  poor.  However,  a  recent  update  of  this  work  provides  a  rural-urban
disaggregation showing that the incidence of spending on rural secondary schools
is very much better than that of urban secondary schools.
. The  level  of  parental  contribution  is  high,  which  is  likely  to  have  two
consequences. First, it keeps some children out of school. Second, it forces the
poor to send their children to inferior schools because they are unable to provide
textbooks and top-up teachers'  salaries to the same extent as the nonpoor do.
*  In  relation  to  per  capita  household  expenditure the  private  costs  of  primary
education were apparently tolerable even for the poorest households; the ratio of
cost to household expenditure ranged from 13 percent in the bottom quintile to 10
percent  in the top  quintile. In terms of nonfood  expenditure, however the poor
spend as much  as 40 percent  on primary  education. The absolute  amounts  of
spending varied hugely between households.
*  At the secondary level, for the bottom quintile, private costs were equivalent to 83
percent of per capita household expenditure, a heavy burden indeed.
*  At both levels the high cost of education was the single most  important reason
cited for never attending school or dropping out.
*  Although sufficient data are lacking, all the indications were that the standard of
education, especially the standard of education received by the poor, is very low.
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every family starting in 1997 caused a substantial inflow of students (as many as 2.5 million
children in P1). This confirms that there was a large unsatisfied demand for education, even
at the levels where enrollment rates were highest. Appleton (2000b) shows that girls, poor
households  and  children  with  uneducated parents  benefited most.  One  message  that
emerges clearly is the difficulty of knowing exactly the true state of affairs about education,
even where good household surveys exist. The PEAP  consultations mostly focused on
implementation issues, given the huge  private  response to  UPE.  The  findings  of  the
expenditure tracking survey focused people's minds particularly on accountability.
5.4 Primary health
Uganda's  health outcomes are poor. This was not  always the case; in  the  1960s, child
mortality compared well with that in most African countries. Between the mid-1960s  and
the mid-1980s, however, child mortality failed to improve in Uganda, while it improved in
other countries. The most  recent demographic and health  survey (DHS) shows a  clear
improvement in child health outcomes between  1989 and  1995, but  AIDS has  gravely
increased adult mortality. Infectious diseases including diarrhea, malaria and tuberculosis
form a large part of the burden of disease. The poor health performance reflects failures
both in the public and private sectors. Major factors include poor economic performance,
near collapse of the public health service during the 1970s, and limited information.
Three elements provide good theoretical reasons why intervention is needed  to
improve  health.  First,  consumer decisions  about  health  are  seriously  constrained  by
misinformation. In Uganda's case, Mackinnon (1995) finds that parental information about
health is an important determinant of child mortality, even when income and education are
taken into account. The spread of AIDS was certainly accelerated by the  fact that the
disease was initially unknown; extensive media coverage and political leadership have,
however, spread knowledge widely about the illness, as demonstrated by the figures shown
in the  1995 DHS.  Second, the communicable diseases, which are extensive in Uganda,
involve two important kinds of externality: the possibility of infection, and the development
of resistance to drugs that can be accelerated by the use of excessively short courses of
treatment. For instance, many doctors now consider chloroquine almost useless for treating
malaria. Third, acute illnesses such as malaria require rapid treatment. This poses a serious
problem for households unless there are sources of finance that can be tapped very quickly,
and distinguishes health risk from a risk such as harvest failure that typically emerges over a
longer period of time.
The above considerations imply that there is scope for public actions, not only in the
health  sector but  also  in primary  education, to  improve health outcomes. International
evidence confirms that countries taking such actions have reduced mortality faster than
countries  trusting economic growth to  do  the job.  There  is  considerable controversy,
however, about the appropriate role of the state. The existing poor level of health outcomes
indicates that the private sector is also not achieving the desired outcome of improving
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is agreement that some public action is needed.
5.4.1 Public  health  services
The quality of existing public health services in Uganda are perceived as inferior to the
private sector, and there is some disturbing evidence to support this view. Household data
show that the share of poor households among patients is higher in public facilities than in
private  facilities (Appleton and Mackinnon  1995), suggesting that public  facilities are
perceived as a cheaper but inferior option. Nonetheless, both poor and nonpoor in aggregate
use private health services more than public services.
The expenditure tracking  survey carried out in health units  as part of the PEAP
preparation showed that clinic records of resource flows for resources were kept in-kind,
if at all, and that there really were no records of inpatients or outpatients in the clinics.
Through interviews at the clinics, it became clear that medical supplies, by  and large,
reached  the  health  facilities,  probably  because  they were  distributed  to  health  units
directly from the center and did not go through local government. But, for the most part
the  survey instrument  that  had worked  well in  schools  was not  able to  provide  any
substantive quantitative information for health units (Reinikka 2000).
Using focus group discussion, observation, and other qualitative research methods
other researchers found that problems originated within health units. For example, they
found  staff  expropriated  a  large  part  of  drugs  and  medical  supplies  and  sold  them
onwards. The leakage was estimated to be  over 70 percent, on  average (McPake  and
others  1998).  Evidence  suggests  that  the  poor,  who  are  unable  to  pay  for  these
misappropriated supplies, often do not receive even basic health services. These results
indicate  that  the  health  system  continues  to  suffer  from  the  past  legacy  of  poor
government in the  1970s and early 1980s and that the past survival mechanisms  of the
health staff whose salaries used to be extremely low had not yet changed.
Donors accounted for the bulk (77 percent) of recurrent expenditure on primary
health in  1992/93. The government's  contribution consisted mainly of salary payments
and counterpart funds for donor projects. Hospitals that cater to a small urban minority
absorbed as much resources as primary health services.
The main areas of dispute that arose during the PEAP discussions included the
following. First, some argued that the public sector should focus mainly  on preventive
treatments  and  on  public  information. However,  the  boundary  between  curative  and
preventive treatments does  not  coincide with  that  between public  and  private  goods;
inimunization is a private preventive good with positive externalities, just as treatment for
TB  is  a  private  curative good  with  positive  externalities, and  inadequate courses  of
antibiotics are dubious private curative goods with negative externalities. Misinformation
and financing problems arise in all these cases. In health, as in other sectors, evidence of
poor performance is powerful but can be used to support opposite recommendations: either
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withdrawal from service delivery.
Second, views on the feasibility of substantial improvements in publicly delivered
services diverged considerably. Remedies for the quality of public services might include
community-level management, user fees, or the introduction of competition, for instance by
transferring money to community health fimds rather than to facilities. Finally, there was no
general agreement on the role of hospitals and other facilities in the delivery of health care.
One underlying difference may be that cost-effectiveness analysis puts a high value on the
life of children, who benefit particularly firom  improved primary care. If adults are actually
more concerned about adult survival, then the case for emphasizing curative care and
possibly more tertiary care may be stronger. This is a case where technical criteria may not
adequately reflect the underlying values of the society.
5.4.2  Incidence of expenditure
The 1992/93 integrated household survey (IHS) data on health did not permit  a similar
incidence analysis of public expenditure on health as was done in education. The main
problem  is  that  the  IHS  data  do  not  breakdown  health  services  into  the  traditional
categories of primary health care and hospital services. Still, the data provided a valuable
snapshot of the extent to which the sick used both public and private health facilities.
In education utilization was equated with the enrollment rates derived from the
IHS. In the case of health, the analogous concept of utilization would be visits to primary
health facilities  as well as outpatient and inpatient visits to hospitals over  a period  of
time. The IHS only gives a snapshot of utilization of health services at a particular point
in time; that is, responses to illness during the 30-day period preceding the interview, not
the utilization of particular health facilities over a period of time. Moreover, the IHS does
not distinguish between hospitals and lower level health facilities. For these reasons, it
was not possible to calculate unit costs and carry out the standard incidence analysis.
Nevertheless,  the  IHS  data  provided other  useful  information  on  health  care.
Perhaps, the  most  surprising result is  the popularity  of  home treatment.  Of the  four
choices facing them, 38 percent of those in the first quintile who were  sick opted for
home treatment  (World Bank  1996b). Even among the fifth quintile, 26 percent chose
home treatment.  Home  treatment may be  entirely appropriate, but  it could also  be  an
indication that some of the sick do not have much confidence in outside treatment, or that
they are deterred by the costs or poor quality of outside treatment. Less than half (43
percent)  of the  sick  in  the  first quintile  consulted  a modern  health  service  provider.
Surprisingly, very few of the sick consulted traditional doctors (2 percent overall) which
certainly reflects underreporting.
There is no direct evidence from the IHS on the reasons why the sick flocked to
private health facilities rather than government ones. There is a widespread perception in
Uganda that private facilities (most of them, mission hospitals and clinics) have an edge
over government facilities in terms of staff, morale, equipment, medicines, and general
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(compared to  55 for the government), 47 health  centers, 42 dispensary/maternity units
and an assortment of lower level facilities. For many users, higher quality in the private
sector outweighs the higher prices; it is also possible that the unpredictability of prices in
a public sector where health workers resort to illegal charges is a serious disincentive.
5.5 Agricultural  extension
Agricultural technology in  Uganda  has  stagnated for a  long  time,  and  there  is broad
consensus on the need to improve it; major possibilities include more widespread use of
draft power, improved varieties of seed, more diverse cropping patterns, and the use of
fertilizer. The best way to achieve this, however, is controversial. Constraints on improved
technology include access to markets, credit, information, possibly motivation, and labor
supply. Sometimes when information is a constraint, the private sector has an incentive to
provide it; there are a number of examples in Uganda, including the extensive tobacco
outgrowing in the North-West region. Such schemes may to some extent depend on either
dejure  or defacto  monopsony by traders, and they often involve credit in-kind paid out of
the crop, such that farmers may have an incentive to sell to competing traders and default on
the loans. Where monopsony is exercised, the price received by the farmers is a concern.
Even  where  none  of  these  concerns  arise,  the  nonexcludable nature  of  agricultural
information means that transmission of information to a farmer is likely to generate positive
externalities,  which cannot be fully captured by the provider of information.
Nevertheless, the existing performance of the public agricultural extension service
in Uganda is poor (World Bank 1996c). The evidence from three surveys in the mid-I 990s
suggests  that  between  10  and  30  percent  of  households received  extension  services
households (mainly through farmer's groups) and that the services were appreciated. As
with education, the margin of error in estimates of service coverage turns out to be very
wide. Also, the ability of agents to contact farmers has been severely constrained by limited
expenses, fuel availability, and pay arrears; at one stage the government owed its extension
agents roughly a million dollars in allowances. (We discuss the reasons for the financial
problems in  the  sector in  subsection 5.8). What we  argue here  is that  the  service is
potentially valuable but faces financial and managerial constraints.
5.6  Transport
The transport network declined during the years of general economic decline, and a major
part of the road network needs rehabilitation. In the mid-1990s the government produced a
national highway plan that uses a quantitative set of criteria to prioritize rates of return to
improvements in the existing network.
The PEAP process identified two major poverty issues that needed to be addressed
in  the  existing  strategy. First,  the  criteria used  to  allocate  road  projects  raise  some
distributional concerns. There are good reasons to expect that a large part of the benefits to
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reducing transport costs on the urban market for rurally produced commodities. Where the
rural areas produce an internationally traded commodity and the internal trading system is
competitive, theory predicts that the whole reduction in transport costs will be passed on to
farmers in the form of higher farmgate prices. If the trading network is not competitive,
things are more complex, but there is a good chance that the increased volume of traffic will
be  associated  with  more  frequent visits  by  traders and  therefore  an  increase  in  the
competitiveness of  the  internal trading  system.  If  the  output  of  agricultural  areas  is
nontraded, however, as is the case in many areas of Uganda, then the reduced costs of
transport will be partly captured in lower urban market prices. Meanwhile, the region served
by the road will gain and other competing rural areas are likely to lose. Nonetheless, n all
these cases, at least a  substantial part of the benefits are likely to  accrue to  the rural
producers who are served by the road and who participate in the market.
This raises two distributional issues. The first is whether rural households who do
not engage in either the product or labor market will benefit. In practice, although the extent
of market participation varies, a very high proportion of rural household need some cash,
and must therefore be involved in markets in some way. The second concern, which is more
important, is that the distributional effects on road improvements will depend heavily on
their location. In some countries (for instance Ethiopia), poorer districts are distributed
round the capital and it is hard to identify the distributional effects. In Uganda's  case,
however, the relative poverty of East and North makes a  strong case for favoring these
districts in distributional terms. In principle, the'criteria used in the highway road program
should have taken this effect into accotmt, because the rate of return (based on a standard
application of the highway planning model) was adjusted by a criterion of poverty. There
are two problems with this. First, the use of existing and projected transport levels in the
calculation of rates  of  return may  lead to  an underestimate of  the relative  returns  to
improvements in roads, which  are initially in very bad condition and hence  little used.
Second, the "poverty" criterion, although they did include district income, also included
criteria  such as  "importance of  the region for food  supply," which  effectively double
counted the rate of return and tended to fEavor  more affluent regions.
The second major distributional issue is that rates of return to maintenance appear to
be higher than those to rehabilitation, yet many roads are not being adequately maintained.
The reasons for this are matters of management and local political economy. For instance,
when one part of a district has a totally decrepit road, it can be hard politically to defend
putting money into the maintenance of  the better-preserved roads in  the district,  even
though this is the most efficient thing to do. Hence districts often spend money intended for
maintenance of  feeder roads (which is  their responsibility) on road  rehabilitation. The
design of contracts also poses problems; one model that has worked in some highways in
Africa is to allocate a stretch of road to a particular household, which is paid to keep the
road maintained and is held responsible for its condition.
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The provision of water sources is essentially a public good, being both nonrivalrous (up to a
point) and difficult to exclude for those who have not paid. The returns to improved water
supply take two main forms. First, clean water improves child health. The extent of these
returns remains controversial; the 1993 World Development Report on health argued that
the cost-effectiveness of this intervention is low relative to other child health interventions.
Second, improved access releases household members',  especially women's,  time from
fetching water. A simple basis for assessing the time benefits of water projects is the yalue
of time used carrying water; studies from Africa (Malmberg Calvo 1994) find that water
carrying can amount to as much as  1,000 hours per household per year, and that water
transport involves more effort than other tasks involving transport. The economic value of
this depends on (1) whether labor or leisure is foregone, (2) whether leisure is valued at the
margin as much as labor, and (3) the theoretical model of the household (Mackinnon 1998).
For instance, there may be a strong gender argument for increasing female leisure,
where, as in Uganda (see Appleton 1996b), women have a heavier burden on their time
than men. Neither theory nor Malmberg Calvo's  data provide unambiguous evidence on
whether women  find carrying water burdensome (in some  cases the  social interaction
involved in going to the well is valued), or on whether they would gain extra leisure time or
find themselves working longer hours on other activities. These ambiguities provide a good
reason to  emphasize community participation in the design of water supply projects, in
addition to the fact that only households know which sources they would be prepared to
use. One of the main impacts of the participatory surveys undertaken in 1999 was to induce
an immediate increase in the priority for water supply in public expenditure, which will be
financed by debt relief from the enhance HIPC initiative approved for Uganda in 2000.
Communities are expected to contribute only a small proportion of the capital costs and to
take responsibility for ensuring the facilities are maintained. The success of maintenance
will clearly be critical to the success of the government's program, which envisions 90
percent coverage by 2015 compared to a level of about 50 percent now.
5.8 Legal and policing  services
Although no  quantitative studies have been done, microinsecurity presents very serious
problems for the poor. Two major issues are the physical security of money, and the legal
security of land. To protect these, people need good policing and a legal system they can
rely  on.  The National  Resistance Movement government  in  fact treated  security and
transport as two of its highest priorities when it came to power. The current revision of the
PEAP has placed an increased emphasis on governance, reflecting the finding that both
police and magistrates have a poor rating in a national household survey on corruption and
integrity (Republic  of Uganda  1998); the police  have  been  found  to  have the  worst
reputation of all the major public services.
275.9 Reform:  designing and costing a basic package
The public sector delivers a very complex set of services, some of which have clearly
defined end-users, some of which do not. Public spending in Uganda, however, has not
been directed toward  a clear  set of outputs. Under these circumstances, the quality  of
services inevitably declines if the set of services to which the state is in principle committed
to is too costly to deliver given the existing resource envelope.
Two institutional factors have discouraged planners from thinking in terms of the
recurrent costs of running basic services. First, the budget has often borne only a limited
relation to outcomes, partly because of supplementary requests for expenditure during the
fiscal year, and partly because the use of fiscal policy as the key macroeconomic policy
instrument makes a  smooth flow of expenditure difficult to achieve. Second, plans  for
expenditure are an input into bargaining both with the Ministry of Finance and with donors.
Much important spending, while recurrent in nature, is on the development budget, which is
mostly financed by loans or grants. Both bargaining processes can encourage inflation of
costs, and this is complicated by the existence, in practice, of different cost structures on
donor-funded projects and locally funded spending.
The idea in the PEAP was to design a basic package of services which everyone in
the country should have access to at a price that they could afford. Costing attempts need to
be included at the stage of drawing up options, rather than merely being addressed when a
certain level of service has already been committed to. The relevant notion of costing,
although simple, is often misunderstood. Whhat  policymakers need to know is the recurrent
cost of a given level of service per head of population per year. Unfortunately, the focus of
many discussions between donors and governments are capital costs of a particular activity
within a service, provided to a targeted population which is often only a proportion of those
who need the service, and with incentives toward inflation rather than minimization of costs
on  both  sides. Hence the  process of bargaining between  donors and  government  can
actually distract attention within the countly away from the most  fundamental issues of
planning.
The technical aspect of costing is of very varying difficulty across sectors. In road
maintenance and the  provision  of rural water  supply, costs depend  on  local  physical
conditions; for instance, the costs of providing rural water supply in Uganda are proving
higher than anticipated. The health sector is particularly difficult to cost, for three reasons.
First, the actual prevalence of the major diseases is only approximately known, since the
sample offered by hospital patients is not a representative proportion of the population. In
the case of HIV, estimates of seropositivity are available from random surveys, but this is
not  the case for most  illnesses. Estimates from the demographic and  health  and other
surveys are highly sensitive to patient perceptions of normal behavior in  areas such as
diarrhea, malnutrition, or fever. Second, the costs of treating any particular illness are very
sensitive to the prices of drugs, many of which are imported, even where optimal treatment
regimes  are  actually  delivered. An  extreme example is  provided  by  the  very  recent
emergence of apparently life-saving regimes for HIV which cost at least several thousand
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course treatment for tuberculosis, and the choice of diagnostic method in malaria. The
design  of a  health package  therefore involves costing various options  for treatment  of
particular diseases, identifying those that seem feasible within some overall assumption
about possible  flows  of  expenditure. Third,  the  costs  of  preventive actions  such  as
information are difficult to estimate. At the time of the PEAP, such estimates were not yet
available, and therefore the best that could be done was to use $12 per capita per annum
estimate from the 1993 World Development Report as a basic guide to the likely cost of the
basic health package.
Education and agricultural extension are much easier to cost. The most important
point  is  that  the  cost  of  agricultural extension  is  surprisingly  low  in  terms  of  the
government's  budget; generous assumptions suggest that a  reasonable extension service
could be provided throughout Uganda for a total of about 20 million dollars per year, a
fraction of the cost of education or health packages. Currently, a  more detailed costing
exercise is being undertaken in the context of a restructuring of agricultural services which
is allowing much more local management.
A relatively approximate costing exercise revealed two things. First, some services
could be delivered cheaply if they were given a slightly higher priority in the government
budget  and  managerial  problems  were  dealt  with.  Examples  include  agricultural
extension and feeder road maintenance. The public agricultural extension is recovering
from decades of stagnation, but as noted above performance has not met expectations.
There is a persistent institutional problem here; while all agree on the need to improve the
technology used by  farmers, not all agree on the appropriate means. For instance, the
Ministry  of  Agriculture  has  considered  implementing  a  large  project  to  distribute
subsidized  seed  to  promote  the  growing  of  maize  and  beans.  The  existing  public
extension  service  has  been  supported  by  substantial  donor  projects  in  recent  years;
however, the government is obliged to provide both counterpart funding for the project
and to pay the wages of the extension officers. During decentralization, the number of
extension  assistants  was  drastically reduced.  The fundamental problem here  is  that  a
project designed along these lines cannot function optimally unless the  government at
central and local levels is convinced of its merits and give it the high priority it deserves in
terms  of  expenditures.  But  until  the  project  functions optimally,  it  is  very  hard  to
demonstrate adequate success that will reinforce its support.
Probably the main lesson of this experience relates to project design. Where projects
are designed with  separately funded components that are indispensable, and where one
party will not step in if the other cannot pay or will not pay their share, the projects are
exposed to  multiple risks  of  failure. The justification  for this  arrangement is  that  the
government needs to pay for some of the project to demonstrate its commitment. But if the
government itself is not yet fully convinced, , it makes very little sense to make a project so
dependent on its  contribution; when the project receives low  fiscal priority,  all that is
demonstrated is failure. A better model would be  100 percent external funding in the early
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demonstrated and the popularity of the service ensures it a political constituency.
An alternative is to avoid funding any project unless it is part of a sectoral program
which  is  within  the  government's  medium-term  resources  constraint  and  which  the
government is committed to. Since 1997, iIn accordance with the PEAP, sectoral programs
have become the preferred model for government and donors in Uganda; in agriculture, the
recent  multi-sectoral  Plan  for  the  Modernization  of  Agriculture  is  very  clearly  a
government-led document, and agricultural services within this framework should therefore
not suffer the same problems as in the past.
The choice between these different approaches is not  easy.  If governments are
already seriously committed to issues that donors consider important, then respect for a
sectoral expenditure program is clearly best. But there will be cases where donors or lenders
hope to convince the government of a service's value, so that aid plays a valuable pump-
priming role. And then there are the cases where only temporary funding is needed: for
instance, the mass vaccination for polio. External agencies should seriously consider 100
percent  funding  for  such  efforts.  The  existing  mechanism  of  cost-sharing between
government  and  external  agencies  on  projects  which  the  government is  not  wholly
convinced of is a recipe for failure, and problems similar to those in Uganda have been
widely reported in agricultural extension services in other African countries (see Purcell and
Anderson 1997).
The second thing that the review of costings revealed was that  in many cases
existing expenditure is clearly inadequate to  achieve universal coverage. This  calls for
either a major reallocation within public expenditures or enabling the private  sector to
meet the gap, for example, by targeting a subsidy at the poor or at public goods. The
PEAP called for reallocation.
5.9.1  Delivering the basic package
Estimates based on the recurrent budget and investment plan in 1996 suggested that about
23 percent of total public (including donor) recurrent spending was for four basic services:
primary health, primary education, feeder road maintenance, and agricultural extension.
Although these figures are approximate, and the picture on the capital budget could be
better, they do suggest that there is scope for increasing this share. Since revenue was
growing relatively fast, total recurrent spending could rise, provided that the amount of
recurrent spending funded through the Public Investmnent  Plan by donors is not reduced.
Given the particular importance of recurrent spending for service delivery, both government
and donors should accept this as a  feasible approach. Simulations showed that freezing
spending on other items would allow a very substantial increase in the amount going to
basic services within a few years.
Under the  government's  decentralization program all  basic services are district
responsibilities. Financing an increase in these services therefore requires an increase in the
spending going to  the districts. It is  also necessary that the districts actually spend the
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achieving this; conditions imposed by central government, and bottom-up pressure from an
informed electorate. While the second is more sensitive to diverse local needs, it relies on a
local  political  apparatus  with  little  experience  in  handling  such  substantial  flows  of
resources. An argument for retaining some top-down control it to see government as a
partial altruist; if officials at the center have no direct way of gaining directly from the funds
going to the districts, there is a better chance of their acting impartially to ensure that funds
really are spent on the intended purposes.
It is essential that people know what services they are entitled to. In the case of
education, the President's  commitment to educate four children in each family from 1997
onwards was accompanied by a clear and public delineation of responsibilities between
government and households. This clarity is harder to achieve in other services; one lesson
may be that for a service such as health, the availability of specific treatments for specific
health problems should be publicized, rather than a general commitment to providing health
care. Without such precise publicity, the patient may not know whether they are being
denied treatment because there is no clinical need for them, because the treatment is too
expensive for the public sector to provide, because the facility has run out of drugs, or
because the clinician is deliberately attempting to send the patient to his own private clinic.
If the patient does not know which of these is the case, they are in no position to demand
treatment or to draw people's  attention to abuses in the system. Similarly, in the case of
agricultural extension, it is irnportant to define some level of coverage that would represent
universal access to the benefits of extension.
5.9.2  Cost reduction in service delivery
Costs to the public sector can be reduced in a number of ways. First, the wage structure is
currently under review. It has been necessary to raise wages for schoolteachers, and the low
salaries for nursing aides have also been addressed, as well as the effectively separate levels
of pay for central and local government officials. The gap between donor and government
pay scales still needs to be addressed. One danger is that salaries in some areas could be
pushed up more than is needed to recruit staff of adequate skill and quality, increasing the
costs of delivering labor-intensive service such as education. Similarly, in the health sector
government pay increases have adversely affected the NGO sector. Another difficulty is the
creation of incentives for public sector employees to work in remote areas. Nonpayment of
salaries has been a problem in the past, a  clearly inefficient and demoralizing form of
borrowing which the government has promised to eliminate.
Probably more important, the high proportion of donor contribution in recurrent
spending raises some management issues. At the moment, it is not desirable to end donor
funding  of recurrent  expenditures (whether these are presented under the  recurrent  or
development  budgets)  because  this  further  squeezes  funds  available  for  recurrent
expenditure.  In  general,  donor  spending  should  be  integrated  into  the  medium-term
expenditure framework and sectoral programs designed to deliver basic services. Currently
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donor-funded projects very often observe completely different cost structures from the rest
of government. For instance, project offices are rarely short of supplies, and where donors
are free to recruit at their own pay-scales, there is often a very wide gap between their pay
scale and official ones (for instance, donors'  drivers may be paid more than senior civil
servants). Even where donors try to avoid extravagance, it is quite hard for them to imagine
the tightness of the resource constraint faced as a  daily problem by  most  government
departments.
Governmental efficiency is  certainly  affected by  corruption, which  is  hard  to
quantify. In some  cases popular perception of  corruption is actually a  consequence of
complex accounting systems which make the flow of funds irregular. There is  almost
certainly more scope for donors to urge government to remove specific officials whose
corruption is established, and many Ugandans felt strongly that the donors should act more
strongly on this. One important point is thalt the terms of employment for civil servants
make dismissal a very difficult and bureaucratic procedure with a high standard of proof.
Hence civil servants may remain suspended, and sometimes with access to their offices so
that records can easily be removed, long after their malpractice is known. A more effective
civil service reform program could improve discipline, but the constitutional establishment
of  the  Civil Service Commission might merely  intensify the bureaucracy involved. In
Britain, the downgrading of the standard of proof required to dismiss corrupt police officers
has been an important and popular part of the government's attempts to make the police
service less corrupt, and this might also be popular in Uganda.
The scope for targeting basic services by charging users and exempting the poor is
uncertain. It would be relatively easy to charge urban households more than rural ones;
different charges in different regions would also be distributionally justifiable but could be
politically divisive. The ability of local service providers to identify and exempt the poor is
not clear, and it is likely that such schemes will in practice exclude some of the poor from
the service. Of course, this may be better than failure to deliver the service at all.
T'here is  scope  for using more  local contractors  and materials  in basic  capital
investments such as classrooms. Equally, NGOs may well be able to provide some services
more  cost-effectively than  the  state;  it  is  proposed  to  establish  health  maintenance
organizations (HMOs) to  explore these options in the health sector. Local govermments
need to be  encouraged to consult NGOs throughout the planning process and  delegate
functions to them where and when this is the most efficient way of delivering services.
6. Land, Credit  and Security  of Assets
The speed of poverty reduction depends on the access of the poor to productive assets. The
most important asset for many Ugandan households remains land, and hence policy toward
land has an  important bearing on poverty reduction. Land policy issues are much more
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is the  outcome of  a  political and  legal process, as  well as  economic forces, and  the
interpretation of  existing land rights is  contentious. Hence the definition of  the  legal
framework is important for the welfare of the poor; and the principle of respecting property
rights is not enough to determine policy where policy rights require interpretation.
The PEAP of  1997 says relatively little about land issues but  instead focuses on
economic policy and public services.  However, there was a parallel consultative process and
a lively national debate on land going on simultaneously with the PEAP process as new
land legislation was being drafted, following the promulgation of the  1995 Constitution
which set parameters for a land policy but left the details unresolved. This section explores
the issue of  land extensively, given its  importance to  poverty reduction. It also briefly
touches upon access to credit and financial services as well as the security of productive
assets.
6.1 Existing  land rights
Traditional land rights in Uganda, as in other societies, are highly complex and diverse.
Four main forms of legally recognized tenure exist, in addition to at least two important
forms of unrecognized tenure. First, mailo land: this land, which includes much of the best
land in the country, was vested in  about 1,000 members of the aristocracy in  1900, but
much of it is under a  form of tenancy known as kibanja which  confers use rights and
security and is tradable. Rents on these holdings were fixed in 1928 at levels, which became
insignificant in real terms. In  1975, however, Idi  Amin's  land act officially abolished
tenancy, obscuring the legal status of mailo land. The result is that the relative status of
kibanja and ttaka claims on mailo lands is open to dispute. So far, this has not led to an
enormous amount of conflict on  the ground (Kigula 1993) because  in  most  cases the
kibanja tenants have not been evicted, but there is  clearly a disagreement of principle
between those who would like to see the kibanja holders simply as tenants of the ttaka
holders, and those who argue that the kibanja right is more valuable than a commercial
tenant's right. This dispute is of acute political sensitivity because the mailo owners are
Baganda; they may feel that exclusive attention to mailo without attention to other forms of
inequality is ethnically discriminatory (though naturally Baganda kibanja holders may feel
differently). For instance, the question 'if you are going to tax land, why not livestock as
well?'  is sometimes asked, with a subtext which reflects the different regional profiles of
these forms of wealth.
Customary tenure is the term generally used to refer to traditional land rights. These
lands are individualistic to varying degrees, and in some cases had already become tradable
before any legal titling was introduced. In land-scarce,  highly commercialized areas such as
Kisoro purchase and sale of land is very common and straightforward and in some cases
freehold has been issued (Republic of Uganda 1996b); in other areas there are significant
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between  individually held  land  and  common  property.! Freehold tenure  exists  under
ordinances passed in 1900 and 1901 for Ankole and Toro. By the terms of the 1975 Land
Decree, however, all freehold was transformed into leasehold held by the state.
Leasehold tenure is extensive in Uganda. Under the terms of legislation passed in
1967, customary tenants were protected from eviction by  leaseholders. The  1975 Land
Decree, however, radically changed the form of tenancy, vesting all land in the state and
effectively recognizing neither customary nor mailo tenure, and reducing existing freeholds
to leasehold status. Encouraged by government policy, titling of leasehold properties seems
to have accelerated during this period. Leasehold and freehold titles have thus been issued
on a significant part of the country, but it is not known how much. The legality of many of
the land titles issued on formerly public land is unclear. Until 1975 customary owners had
security of tenure on their land legally; but  from  1975 to  the present, they have been
technically tenants on sufferance on public land. Nevertheless, several steps-including
surveying and compensation-are  required before customary occupiers can be  evicted.
Some leases have been issued without going through these steps; in others the facts are
disputed. This dispute concerns both agriculturalists and nomadic pastoralists, and in some
cases this form of dispute has become violent as in the Sembabule dispute described by
Ddungu (1994).
In addition, there are two forms of rental which have no legal recognition but are
widely practiced, known as "borrowing" and "renting" land. Typically, renting is a form of
commercial tenancy with some limited security; borrowing may involve some obligations
in-kind and comes with very little security indeed. Typically, the landlord will prohibit the
use of permanent structures or crops to protect his land rights (Muhereza 1992). Where (as
very often) an owner has too much land to farm himself, it provides an alternative to wage
labor, which involves lower supervision costs. In some cases the borrowing arises within an
ethnic group; in  others, notably in Kabarole, immigrant ethnic groups from  land-scarce
areas have borrowed land from local landowners (Kigula 1993).
In addition to the disputes concerning mailo and leasehold land, the rights of women
and children can give rise to disputes. For instance, land is traditionally meant to pass to a
dead man's children, but if they are minors the land may be vulnerable. Intrafamily disputes
have  been  recorded  in  Kigula  (1993).  According to  the  latest  household  survey  of
1999/2000, land conflicts  exist in about half of the communities (Deininger  and Okidi
2000). Unless ways are found to establish a cost-effective way to implement the recently
6 The pattern  of land scarcity  and commercialization  increasing  the individuality  of indigenous  rights is
well  known  in Africa  ( Migot-Adholla,  and others  1991;  Bruce  and  Migot-Adholla,  eds. 1993).
' Confusingly,  individualistic  customary  ownership  is sometimes  called  kibanja  although  the term will be
used here  to  refer only  to tenants  on mailo  land.
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stability and development.
The  1995  Constitution  recognizes  four  forms  of  tenure,  customary,  mailo,
freehold and  leasehold. It  also, unusually, makes a  specific commitment to  introduce
legislation to resolve the disputed relation between ttaka and kibanja tenants within two
years  (the  issue  turned  out  to  be  too  controversial to  settle  within  the  Constituent
Assembly).
6.2  The existing distribution of land
The  aggregate amount of  land available in  Uganda  has been  estimated at  18 million
hectares; this would represent 6 hectares or more per farm household. Nevertheless, in 1990
the total area cultivated was estimated at only 4.6 million hectares (World Bank 1993). We
can distinguish a number of possible reasons for the limited amount of cultivation: (1)
limited capacity to farm a large areas imposed by technology, (2) limited access to product
markets which reduces the incentive to produce, and (3) limited access for most  farm
households caused by the combination of severe asset inequality and poorly functioning
factor markets.  All  three  play  a  part;  the  importance of  the  third  element  is  widely
underestimated in Uganda.
It is widely believed either that Uganda's land distribution is relatively equal, or that
there is a relatively equal distribution within each region although a marked differential
across  land-scarce  and  land-abundant  areas  exist.  Unfortunately,  no  aggregate  Gini
coefficient or other inequality measures are available either for the distribution of land or,
perhaps  more relevantly, for the distribution of wealth. What  evidence exists  suggests
considerable inequality both between and within regions.
We can consider inequality at the bottom or at the top. At the bottom, both large-
scale data and village level studies suggest that the proportion of households with no access
to land was less than 5 percent in 1992 (Appleton and Mackinnon 1995). These households
include some better-off households, for example, government officials, who typically have
compensating forms of wealth such as human capital. As a result, rural households that
farm no land are on average better off than other rural households. Village-level studies,
however, suggest that there is a poor wage-earning class, about 10 percent in a study in
Lango (Opyene  1993) and 6 percent in Kisoro (Mugisha 1992). In some cases landless
people migrate, for example, to fishing villages (Muhereza 1992); Appleton and Mackinnon
(1995) note the relative high proportion of rural nonfarming households in Kalangala and
Jinja because of fishing.
But there are four ways other than the transformation of smallholders to "landless
labor" in which poverty is severely exacerbated by inadequate access to land. First, many
households have access to  only small plots.  Data from the 1992 IHS  suggest that the
median area cultivated per adult equivalent is 0.6 acres; for a typical household of five
people including children, this translates into less than 1.5 acres. World Bank (1993) finds
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amount  cultivated includes  land borrowed  on terms that  preclude  the  construction  of
permanent structures or perennial crops. Examples are found on mailo land owned by the
church in  Kalangala (Ssenkumba 1993) and in the practice of "borrowing" land found
throughout Uganda (Muhereza 1992). Vill]age-level  studies indicate that next to landless
labor, the poorest group is those who have no land of their own and can only borrow land
from landlords. Third, a considerable  proportion of land cultivated is borrowed or rented; so
many households are paying rents for a significant part of the land they use. Rental rates
have not been extensively studied but Mugisha (1993) reports rents varying from 10 to 50
percent of the value of production in the land-scarce South-West. For a poor household,
these rents can irnpose a very severe burden. Fourth, people may be driven into desperate
actions to acquire land. This applies particularly to women who have no land rights in their
own right in parts of Uganda; rural women can therefore become dependent on marital or
extramarital relations with men to  ensure an income for themselves and their children.
Anecdotal evidence indicates that such pressures can lead to an increased incidence of HIV
among poorer women.
At the top, there is a significant amount of land in the hands of very few. Sampling
problems, absentee residence and difficulties in interpreting outliers in large-sample surveys
can make it hard to detect this phenomenon; these therefore need to be complemented by
the village-level studies. In one such study iin  Lango, 87.7 percent of the land in one village
is owned by 2 of the 127 households (Opyene 1993). In one village in Kabale, 33 percent of
the land is owned by 7 percent of the households (Mugisha 1992). In Masindi two-thirds of
the land in one village was owned by one landlord (Bazaara 1992). While these cases are
extreme, all the village studies reveal more iinequality  than expected.
Two aspects of these large landowners are worth noting. First, the source of their
ownership  is  often  past  access  to  political  power,  both  for  mailo  owners  and  for
leaseholders. Mugisha (1993) finds that the existing inequality arises from the allocation in
the 1930s by the state of titles to what was then an uncultivated, though communally used,
swamp; seven households benefited of which five were either administrative chiefs or state
functionaries. In Apac, of the leases issued between 1976 and 1991, 37 percent went to
individual  farmers and  traders, whereas  54  percent  went  to  members  of  Parliament,
government  officials,  policemen,  soldiers, land  board  members,  and  District  Council
members (Opyene 1993). The lease discussed above which led to the extreme concentration
of landownership in a village in Lango was issued to a police officer in President Amin's
regime. In Bunyoro, certificates  of occupancy issued in the 1930s formalized the land rights
of the aristocracy of the Bunyoro from whom most tenants were renting land (Bazaara
1992).
Land sales have been much less important than political power in  causing land
inequality. The people who have most typically bought their land in Uganda are kibanja
holders who have bought their kibanja rights and have in some cases gone on to buy out the
ttaka owner as well; also, many people in the South-West region have traded in the active
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land committees (DLCs) are corrupt or where the condition of issuance of the lease includes
demonstration of financial capacity to develop the land (Kigula 1993).
Second, large landowners are not always interested in farming. There is a significant
category of absentee landlords. But there are also rural owners who are not particularly
interested in farming. For instance, in the village in Masindi where one household owns
two-thirds of the land, most of the land is rented out to pastoralists for grazing. Muhereza
(1992) reports that most of the leases issued in Luwero went to old people who let their
fields out to others. Where land is rented out landlords sometimes bring in tenants -from
outside because, as one  study says: "indigenous people are difficult to  evict"  (Opyene
1993).
Since the inequality in existing holdings reflects past political power rather than
market forces, it is not likely to promote efficiency. Indeed, in the mailo areas where trade
in kibanja tenancies has been extensive fragmentation rather than concentration has been
the pattern (Mukwaya 1953 cited in Marquardt 1994); the same seems to be true in the
South-West where trade is extensive and inheritance practices encouraged subdivision.
The current evolution  of land distribution is  even harder to  ascertain than the
existing distribution. However, five processes are likely to be operating. First, widows' land
rights  often depended  remarriage to  the  husband's  brother:  AIDS  has  disrupted this
mechanism.  Male  orphans'  land rights  although  traditionally protected  may  also  be
vulnerable in practice. Second,. land is widely seen as a very attractive investment by urban
residents. Third,  continued population growth  is  increasing pressure  on  land,  causing
cultivated area to expand sometimes at the expense of soil fertility, and causing rural-rural
and rural-urban migration, as well as increased of "borrowing" and "renting" of land, as
small producers run out  of their own land and turn to larger owners for tenancy. This
process is driving up the returns to holding large landholdings and is therefore likely to
increase inequality and the efficiency costs of inequality. In this sense, premature allocation
of titles to "vacant" land in the 1930s, which seemed distributionally innocuous at the time,
may  be  generating inequality  in  the  1990s. Fourth,  district  land  commissions have
continued to function and presumably to issue titles. The proportion of Uganda that has
been allocated to  large landholders is therefore probably rising  constantly. Finally, the
emphasis on draft power in  the government's modernization strategy for agriculture is
intended to increase the areas that farmers can cultivate. One consequence of this will be to
increase the demand for land; it is important that land pclicy takes this into account.
6.3 Economic  consequences of the existing distribution
The extent to  which  land is a  constraint on productive activities is  much disputed in
Uganda; many people argue that labor is the main constraint, especially at the existing level
of technology. Data from the IHS shows that the amount of land owned is a significant
determinant of welfare across households, and that the poor in most  districts (including
AIDS-affected areas and land-abundant areas) have higher labor-land ratios than the rich
37(Appleton and Mackinnon 1995).  Nevertheless, the bivariate correlation between landowner
and welfare, though positive and significant.,  is small. Aggregate figures indicate an increase
in productive area but also a decline in productive area per head. Finally, the village-level
studies  strongly  suggest  that  poverty  writhin the  village  is  strongly  influenced  by
landholding, though this involves terms of landholding as well as amount.
The  inefficiency caused  by  the  existing  pattern  of  land  distribution  may  be
considerable, and there are two main channels for this. One is inefficient allocation of land
to  farmers, inducing  a  divergence of marginal products  across different  farmers. The
diversity of land-labor ratios across income groups suggests that the marginal product of
labor is higher on small farms; if so, Uganlda  is showing the same pattern as many other
countries in Africa and elsewhere. Also, the marked regional divergence in the availability
of land and the large areas of unused land strongly suggest that the allocation is inefficient.
The inefficiency of the allocation is not corrected by factor markets, partly because large
landowners are not particularly entrepreneurial,  and frequently absent, and therefore do not
employ wage labor as much as the allocation suggests would be needed; and because the
institution of rental, though it exists, is insecure for both parties and the suspension of all
rental on mailo land has reduced the supply of land for tenancy.
The other way in which existing rights may generate inefficiency is that the nature
of land rights may reduce or distort investment. This is a much more complex issue than
generally appreciated. One channel that mLay  be quickly disposed of is that  land titling
would enable the use of land as collateral. Evidence in other African countries indicates that
the use  of  land to  secure formal lending is very  limited, in  contrast to  experience in
Thailand (see the study by Migot-Adolla and others 1991 of Ghana, Kenya and Rwanda).
One reason for this is that land rights are often enough disputed and land markets thin
enough to make foreclosure unrewarding for the lender (the Thai case was atypical because
none of these features operated). In Uganda's case titled land has been used as collateral,
though the evidence suggests that this has usually financed investment in urban activities
where returns are quicker and safer than in agriculture. In any case, it seems very unlikely
that the rural poor would be interested in mortgaging their land on a large scale, in Uganda
or anywhere else, if they believed that defauilt  would really provoke foreclosure. Hence this
argument, which has been used prominently as a justification for the titling of customary
land, does not seem convincing.
The second, and much more important, possibility is that the disputed and unclear
status of land rights may affect investment. On the one hand, the standard argument is that
insecurity reduces investment because the investor fears they will lose the value of the
investment. On the other hand, if investment strengthens the investor's claim on the land,
the exact opposite may occur (Besley 1996). For much kibanja land, this  seems to be
exactly what has happened: on mailo land in Luwero, "To increase their security in their
holding, these tenants planted the greatest percentage of their holdings with perennial crops
such as coffee and bananas in order to make the profitability of eviction appear costly in
terms of compensation" (Muhereza 1992). T  he point is that the if the ttaka holder wanted to
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Finally, a third possibility is that the landowner may prevent the tenant  from investing
because he fears he will lose control over the land. This is documented in church-owned
mailo  land  in  Kalangala  (Ssenkumba  1993)  and  widely  in  non-mailo  cases.  This
inefficiency radically undermines the purpose of agricultural reform, which is to encourage
small farmers to invest in commercial agricultural activities.
Much discussion associates the efficiency impact of tenurial insecurity with mailo
land. However, the evidence suggests that mailo land functioned relatively efficiently in
Uganda until the late 1960s.  Mailo land was subdivided extensively by smallholder farmers,
and those farmers who bought kibanja and in some cases went on to buy ttaka as well
became one of the most dynamic elements in Uganda's  economic progress. Indeed, the
experience is used by Feder and Noronha (1987) as a model example of a  secure land
system. The examples of inefficiency given above are associated at least as much with other
forms of title as with mailo.
Finally, to what extent does landownership  drive income and expenditure inequality
in Uganda? If it is accepted that land is a significant constraint on production for many
households, then the impact on income follows naturally. Appleton and Mackinnon (1995)
find that land does significantly affect household welfare though the bivariate correlation is
low. Village-level studies confirm this impression, though the view has been expressed that
the old ttaka owners include some nonentrepreneurial characters who have done nothing
with their land and are now extremely poor as a result. Interregional differences, however,
are not well explained by land per capita; the most land-scarce areas are not the poorest.
6.4  What legalform should land rights take?
Land policy  needs  to  begin  with  a  legal  framework that  articulates  the  legal
mechanisms  available  to  agents.  Although  some  commentators  have  argued  for
uncompensated expropriation of  large owners in  Uganda, the  government has  a  clear
commitment to restore the confidence of national and foreign investors in property rights
and would therefore not consider this step. Moreover, if attempted, expropriation could very
easily ignite serious ethnic conflict. Hence the feasible space of propoor policy is that which
respects existing property rights. The Constitution provides a basic framework whereby the
four existing forms of land ownership can gradually be converted into freehold at a locally
determined pace. The parameters set by the Constitution are broad, however, and there is
considerable room  for both  legislation and  other forms of public  action to  affect the
outcomes.
6.4.1  The impact offormal  titling on poverty
Although titling is not demonstrably necessary to give security or to increase investment in
general (see Migot-Adholla and others 1991; and Atwood 1990), it has three theoretical
advantages: security for the farmer, collateral for the investor, and ease of migration for
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poor, not a strong argument. The reduction of insecurity and the increased possibility of
migration, however, do represent potentially significant benefits.
If poor people in land-scarce areas can move to occupy land in more abundant areas,
this could reduce poverty. But given the transactions costs, the poor will not be able to
migrate without assistance of some form. Security provides a major argument; insecurity is
widespread, and affects not only existing tenants' situation but also reduces the supply of
tenantable land. Therefore, titling could in  principle do  some good  by  improving the
functioning of the important rental market.
The down side  of  titling can reduce  the rights of  the poor  in  three  ways, all
documented in Uganda. First, someone not previously considered to be a landlord may get
title to a land which others are occupying, and proceed either to evict them or charge them
rent. While safeguards have existed to prevent this from happening, they have not always
been effective. For instance, the large lease given to the police officer in the village in
Lango discussed above (Opyene 1993) was on communally owned land that had been used
for cultivation and other purposes. The landlord assured the elders that he would allow this
to  continue, but  has  since succeeded (partly by  importing tenants  from  elsewhere) in
enforcing control over the whole area. Second, title can be declared on communally used
land such as swamps or pastoralists' grazing land. Again, rights have often been overridden
in Uganda's case: the Semababule  uprising arose partly because of the loss of grazing rights
by nomadic pastoralists (Ddungu 1994). Arguably, the titling of land by aristocracies in
Bunyoro and  Buganda had  elements of  this  because  although these  aristocracies had
traditional rights, they differed from the rights of a commercial landlord. Fonnal titling may
thus confer on traditional ownership a meaning it did not have traditionally. Third, title can
be declared on vacant land which at the time of the titling is not in demand; as population
pressure increases, this land comes to be rented out by the person who acquired the title, and
those who wish to cultivate the land then have to pay rent. An example of this process is
given in Mugisha (1992); title was given to some swampy ground in the 1930s which was
not occupied at the time. Now, after population growth, the holders of this title make a large
amount of income as landlords. This third process, unlike the first two, is clearly legal, and
accounts for the development of inequality in some areas.
Since the holders of leases in Uganida are very often not farmers, the history of
titling in Uganda  is at best  a double-edged one; titling has probably done  as much to
expropriate the poor as to promote development. Ironically, the much-maligned operation
of mailo between 1928 and 1975 was probably the most benign case of titling in Uganda's
history.
6.4.2  Theform  of title
The Constitution recognizes four forms of title but strongly suggests that most land will
move toward freehold. However, other fonns of title are mooted including certificates of
occupancy, which most people are expected to settle for initially. The first issue is the
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unsatisfactory  form of title; if extensions  are costly they will lack the capital to extend
their lease  when it runs out; if extensions  are free,  there is no great appeal  in undermining
their security  by limiting  the length  of title. For larger holdings,  however,  leasehold  has a
considerable  distributional  advantage  because  it allows  land to revert to the owners  and to
be reallocated  at the end of the lease. We saw above that some titles granted in the 1930s
are now generating  considerable  inequality  and inefficiency.  Admittedly,  this argument  is
somewhat  balanced  by negative incentive  effects.  But the District  Land Boards should  at
least be encouraged  to consider  seriously  the leasehold  as a form of title.
The reasons  for giving  a separate  form of title to customarily  held land as opposed
to freehold  presumably  have  to do with the difference  in the tradability  of customary  land.
This is acceptable  provided  that  customary  land  is really  protected  from  the imposition  on it
of a higher  interest.  This  requires  both adequate  legislation  and effective  enforcement.
If freehold  is to be the main form of tenure,  what form should  it take?  Major issues
here are the decisions  about sale and practices associated  with divorce and inheritance.
Husbands' and wives' interests  may conflict  if the husband  is very ill, if he is imprudent,
and if he wishes to marry another  wife. There is good reason to require the consent of
immediate  family  to land  sales  for these  reasons.  This  can be done either  by vesting  the land
in the name  of several  individuals,  or by constituting  the family  as a legal  entity  and vesting
the land  in it, or by simply  writing  the  requirement  for consent  into the land  legislation.
A  proposal that caused considerable  controversy  in  the  mid-1980s, and was
physically shouted down in the Constituent  Assembly,  the right of women to have a
specified share of household  assets in the event of divorce. Bargaining  models of the
household  strongly  suggest  that this would benefit  not only divorced  women but also the
bargaining position of married women within the household. Household survey data
suggest that households  headed by  divorced women are better off than the average
household  (Appleton  and Mackinnon  1995);  the likely explanation,  however, is not that
divorce  is a good option  but that  it is a very  bad option  for most poor  women  to consider.
The inheritance  rights of women and children  in the event of the death of a male
head of household  require  protection.  Where  no will exists,  customary  law, in most cases,
vests the land in the sons. Legislation  could  perhaps  help by specifying  rights of widows
and of daughters  where there is no will and no son to inherit, or where the head of
household's sons expropriate  the widow (who may not be their mother). Widows are
markedly worse off than the rest of the population (Appleton and Mackinnon 1995;
Republic  of Uganda  1999).  At the same,  proposals  to discourage  the subdivision  of estates
among  the young  should  be avoided;  inefficiencies  caused  by excessively  small plots can be
avoided  provided  the siblings  cooperate  in production,  and  the proposal  would  significantly
worsen  an already  unequal  distribution  (Republic  of Uganda  1993).
All of these inheritance  proposals-especially those supporting  female rights on
divorce and inheritance-encountered  considerable  resistance  as many Ugandan men felt
that inherited  land should  stay in the male line of the family.  As has been noted elsewhere,
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behavior (see Pinckney and Kimuyu 1994 for findings in Kenya and Tanzania).
While these protections are valuable, two caveats are in order. One is that parents
can  sometimes  extract  more  remittances  from  their  children  through  controlling  the
inheritance of land; this effect has been studied in Botswana (Lucas and Stark 1995) and
Kenya (Hoddinott 1992). This can be good for poverty in the case of the poor elderly when
land is their only asset. Second, the suspicion sometimes expressed that land markets will
lead to land sales by the poor and resulting impoverishment is theoretically justified, but
does not  receive great prima facie  support from the empirical pattern of  land trade  in
Buganda under mailo land, nor from the fact that expropriation of the poor has been caused
much more by administrative than market mechanisms in Uganda's history. The effects of
the tradability of  land will  depend on the policy  context, and whether its  advantages
outweigh its disadvantages will depends on the whole poverty reduction strategy.
In the event, the land act included a clause requiring consent for land sales on the
part of adult children and spouses, but a clause providing for co-ownership of assets by
wives was  dropped  at a  late  stage of  discussion among considerable substantive and
procedural controversy. While the powerful  lobby for the co-ownership clause has not
achieved all its objectives, it has definitely put this issue on the agenda (whereas an earlier
proposal that women should have a right to a specified share of household assets in the
event of divorce was physically shouted down in the Constituent Assembly, as mentioned
earlier).
6.4.3  Who should get newfreehold?
The discussion above suggests a number of principles when  considering the merits  of
leasehold and freehold tenure. First, land titles should not be issued to someone who is not
the customary owner without the agreement of those who are occupying the land. Second,
the issuance of additional large titles shoulcl  be restricted except in cases where titling either
generates a large volume of employment or offers benefits to smallholders. 8 Where such
benefits are promised, they should form explicit conditions for the lease to be valid. Such a
policy resembles a flexible land ceiling on new titles, which raises different issues from
imposing land ceilings on already issued titles. Third, a freehold title may be justified where
land is  unambiguously owned by  a  customary owner  and rented  out,  but  should be
conditional on tenant's  security at reasonable rentals. New title to  large pieces of  land
should not be  given to  those who will leave it idle. It  is not  clear from the literature,
however, how much land really falls into this category.
The establishment of these principles could do much to enhance the efficiency of
land use in Uganda. The appropriate  balance between legal and administrative mechanisms
8 For instance,  a large  ranch  offering  facilities  for  slaughtering  animals  to smallholders  with  livestock;  this
has  happened  very  successfully  in some  countries  in the Pacific.
42for achieving them is  an important issue requiring further work. Many of the concerns
identified  could be  addressed by  a  process of  systematic titling,  which  makes  local
consultation easier than the opportunistic titling of the past. Whether or not  there is a
demonstrable productivity benefit, a process of systematic titling might have considerable
merit as a means for protecting the land rights of the poor, which are otherwise vulnerable
to the inherent abuse of opportunistic titling.
64.4  How should existing leases be dealt with?
It has been suggested that all leases owned by Ugandan nationals should be converted to
freehold. One argument for this is that some leases are on properties that were freehold
before 1975. The merits of automatic conversion for leases which have been issued this way
are not entirely clear; the policy will amount to a costless increase in wealth for the better
off in  a  fiscally constrained economy, so something can be  said for  charging for the
conversion.
More important issues relating to the conflict between owners and occupiers can be
illustrated in the following three areas. First, leases that were issued illegally should be
revoked; however, legal challenges in practice may be difficult. Legal aid to the poor in
pursuing such cases was proposed in the Poverty Action Plan but mechanisms are not yet in
place. Grey areas may arise where land leases were legal under the 1975 Land Reform but
arguably unconstitutional because they expropriated occupants of the land. Second, leases
that were issued legally but are responsible for both inequality and inefficiency pose the
most difficult policy problem; legal recognition of these rights may have to be accompanied
by other actions. Third, although the Constitution defines mailo as a distinct form of tenure,
this is controversial; many mailo owners would prefer simply to be regarded as the owners
with tenants. As we already pointed out, this view is a misrepresentation of the rights that
mailo owners and kibanja tenants had under the legislation in force from 1928 to 1975. It
therefore seems most just to treat mailo as sui generis and to restore the terms on mailo
land, including the restrictions on rent, which operated between 1928 and 1975. In many
cases kibanja holders may eventually buy out their ttaka owners, but provided the system
has credibility, the evidence suggests that the mailo system is compatible with efficiency.
6.4.5 Mechanisms of enforcement
In designing a land law, mechanisms of enforcement are as important as the structure of
land rights. If these mechanisms are remote from communities, there is a greater risk of
communities'  needs  being  ignored in  the  decisions.  But  a  substantial  administrative
structure at local levels can be prohibitively expensive. Even if a network of local land
institutions  is  established,  the  location  of  powers  of  decision  is  important,  as  are
requirements to disclose applications for title in the locality of the land affected and to
ascertain local circumstances before allocating title.
43The allocation of title to  applicants raises policy questions about land use. For
instance, one  district land board  might ltake the view that  smallholder agriculture was
efficient and refuse applications for large leases if there were competing smallholder uses
for the land; another board might take exactly the opposite view, encouraging extensive
eviction of  existing  occupants to  make  way  for  large  tenants. Given  the widespread
identification of 'large-scale' with 'commercial' in Uganda, there is a reason to believe that
many district land boards would be  uncluly inclined to  favor large developers and  be
vulnerable to bribery. Local land use plails are to be prepared at all levels, which should
provide an opportunity for land use to be debated locally, but it may still be difficult to
ensure that the decisions of land boards actually respect the priorities identified by policy.
Both these arguments suggest that democratic control of the land boards is crucial.
Democratic  control  does  not  mean  intervention  (political  or  otherwise) in  particular
decisions but  rather  ensuring that  the  decisions can be  audited  and  that  clear  policy
directions are provided to the land boards. Also, the Inspectorate General of Government
should be required to inspect the integrity,  of the land boards'  procedures. Dubious land
allocation procedures have been a source of corruption in many developed countries and the
importance of these decisions make this a ligh-priority issue within the legal system.
6.5 Areas for further  public action
In addition to establishing the right legal framework, various forms of public action have
been proposed. The first and least controversial, is the provision of legal services to the poor
to ensure that they are aware of and able to exercise their legal rights. Whatever the legal
status, titling endangers the rights of the poor if they are not informed about it or if it is
performed at a level of the judicial system to which they do not have effective access.
Providing information is relatively cheap; providing legal services is more costly. It was
strongly argued during the PEAP process that information on legal rights as well as legal
services merit inclusion in the basic package of public services. However, currently even
most criminal cases do not actually receive legal aid because of budgetary constraints.
Second, taxation of land is a policy option. Sensitivity on this proposal, however, is
considerable, not simply because of the economic interests involved but because of fear that
the tax could be  abused to expropriate people. In particular, some see the imposition of
taxation on land as regionally inequitable because livestock is more a important form of
wealth in the West of the country. Because of this concern, any tax on land would be best
voted, administered, and retained at district level. Some districts might then choose to tax
livestock as well. 9 Third, and quite controversially, there is the possibility of using public
funds to assist in resolving land issues. The significant amount of underused land in the
hands of large landlords makes this potentially a valuable form of public action. However,
9  Skinner  (199  la,b) notes  that  the international  trend  toward  a reduction  in the use of land  taxes  applies  to
centrally  administered  but not locally  administered  taxes.
44administration is difficult and will require careful use of international experience. Major
issues include:
*  Where  should  the  scheme  be  applied?  Much  discussion  has  focused  on  the
compensation issue on mailo land. However, the evidence suggests that mailo land is no
more inefficient than the other forms of large land ownership found in Uganda. It would
also be much better for political unity to recognize that the issue is broader than mailo.
*  Mortgaging land to secure loans made to smallholders by a land fund.  Considerable
appeal, in principle, exists for this option. However, the history of nonrepayment in
public  credit  schemes,  both  in  Uganda  and  elsewhere,  suggests  caution.  Unless
successful lending practices to the poor for the purchase of land can be documented, a
grant approach may be preferable.
*  Cost-sharing. An element of cost-sharing would be desirable on incentive grounds but
might make it impossible to target the poorest.
*  Beneficiaries. The  selection of  the beneficiaries then become  a  major  issue. It  is
reasonable to require the purchasers to live on the land they acquire. It is not reasonable,
as has been done in some countries (for example, Zimbabwe), to restrict their activities.
If the plots provided are small, only the poor will choose to participate and they should
then be allowed the same economic freedoms enjoyed by other Ugandans.
*  Increasing the  price of land. The danger with this form of intervention is that it may bid
up  the price of land, transferring most  of the scheme's benefits to the landowners.
Schemes in other countries should be studied  to see how this can be avoided.
*  Winning local support. It would be imperative to win local people's support in the areas
where land is purchased. For this reason, purchase within the areas from which the poor
themselves come is more promising than a  scheme to  resettle the poor  over large
distances." 0
*  Risk of political  hijacking. Political hijacking of such a scheme could undermine its
intentions, especially if the grant element is explicitly recognized. Another problem is
that the scheme might well be overwhelmed by demand.
For all these reasons, careful technical work is needed before the idea of a land fund
in Uganda can be satisfactorily assessed. But the likely magnitude of the potential benefits
(for both efficiency and distribution) merits a closer look at this option.
10 Another  consideration  is that  the land-scarce  South-West  does not have malaria,  resettlement  to other
parts of the country  would  be likely  to cause  health problems,  as has been found in Ethiopia.  Nonetheless,
resettlement  from  the South-West  to Ankole  was  very  successful  in  the 1950s.
456.6 The Land Act
The above discussion mainly reflects the state of play at the time of drafting the first
PEAP in  1997. In 1998, a new Land Act was passed, which changes the context of the
debate.  The final version  does not  refer to mailo,  effectively treating ttaka  holders  as
owners and kibanja holders as tenants, but it does provide for security and some limit on
the value of rents (2 percent of the capitalized value of land) for all tenants. For kibanja
holders who have been paying no rent for twenty years, rents of this level would represent
a  significant negative income  shock. But  the legislation  also provides  for  security of
tenure for the tenant and establishes a land fund, which is to be used for the following
purposes:
*  to compensate people who are being evicted from government-owned land;
*  to enable people to register laind;
*  to enable tenants to buy out owners; and
*  to enable the poor landless to buy land.
However, the prioritization of these activities and the amounts of money that should be
committed remain controversial.
Finally, the legislation established a network of land tribunals down to the parish
level. However, the costs of this network have proven greater than anticipated, and therefore
a revision of the land act is under consideration.  In the meanwhile, the new system is not yet
functional and is creating a backlog of unresolved disputes, since the powers formerly
vested in the local courts will be attached to the tribunals under the new legislation.
6.7  Credit and security of assets
Before the Poverty Eradication Action Plan was  developed, the government had  been
providing credit through the district administrations in a scheme known as Entandikwa. The
difficulties associated with politically implemented public credit schemes are well known
and it does not appear that Entandikwa (despite its careful design) avoided them. Similar
and previous attempts also ran into problems, including a large scheme run by the Uganda
Commercial Bank known as the small fanners' credit scheme.
The microfinance  strategy now  evolving has  two  main  components. First,  all
Ugandans  should  have  access  to  some  kind  of  financial  institution.  Deposit-taking
institutions have a particular role in reducing insecurity that has afflicted Uganda in the past
and continue to affect the poor; the fear of theft is a disincentive to accumulation. This
objective could  be  met  in  a  number of  ways.  The  branch  network  of  the  Uganda
Commercial Bank has been reduced during the privatization of the institution, causing
widespread concerns about access to the financial system. Similarly, the subsequent closure
of the Co-operative Bank reduced the nuniber of rural branches. Options include the revival
46of the Post Office Bank and some support to ensure a minimal presence of the commercial
bank at least in each district.
Second, there is an intention to support market-driven expansion of microfinance
institutions such as "village banks," as well as credit schemes of various forms, some of
which (such as Foundation for International Community Assistance-FINCA)  have been
successful. In addition, there are various forms of credit in-kind such as outgrower schemes
in tobacco. The needs for credit, while substantial, are highly specific to the particular
activity, making a universal entitlement  to credit meaningless. But a universal entitlement to
access to the financial system is likely to be very important to the poor.
Physical insecurity has been a major source of impoverishment, including both
the  direct  effects  of  civil  war  and  various  specific  forms  of  insecurity,  including
widespread cattle-rustling in the East of the country in the 1980s and the 1990s. Conflict
continues to afflict the North of the country very seriously. While efficient use of military
resources-which  consume a substantial proportion of the government's  own recurrent
spending  (2 percent  of GDP)-is  a major issue,  it is outside the scope  of the PEAP
process. What was considered relevant, however, is the effect of insecurity on the asset
holdings  of  the  poor.  Where  assets have  been  destroyed by  insecurity,  there  is  an
unusually strong case for subsidizing their replacement; because households previously
had these assets there is good reason to assume that (provided security is restored) the
assets are economically viable. Traditionally, people in the North and East of Uganda
depended on animal traction for extensive farming. Cattle-rustling deprived farmers of
oxen  plough  as  a  key  productivity  enhancing  technology.  Some  support  has  been
provided  to  households  in  the East  for restocking  cattle,  and  a  national  program  of
restocking has been introduced, where cattle are effectively treated as revolving credit in
kind. Each household is expected to provide the community with one offspring from the
animal they receive so that another household can benefit. According to household survey
evidence, the Eastern region experienced an increase in the number of communities with
oxen to rent from 31 to 72 percent between 1993 and 1995, while in the North continued
insecurity reduced this share from an already low level of 5 percent in  1993 to zero in
1995.
7. Consensus and Controversy
In this concluding section, we offer some thoughts about the process of building consensus
on poverty reduction. We focus on the four principal themes: the meaning of poverty;
macroeconomic policy, public services, and assets. While the PEAP was being drafted,
there were  extensive consultations between government, donors, academia, NGOs,  and
other members of civil society. Another important feature was its close link to the available
resource envelope, government budget and the medium-term expenditure framework. This
47has made it easier for the government to reflect polices they agreed to in its actual spending
programs.
7.1 Meaning  ofpoverty:  growth and distribution
The controversy over the meaning of poverty continues in Uganda, and this has some policy
implications. Because the technical issues involved in measuring an essentially utilitarian
definition of poverty are well known (see Appleton 1996a) and very important in getting the
measurement of poverty right, most of them do not raise strong controversy. The use of a
household-based expenditure measure and the  appropriate price  indices are  sometimes
questioned. For instance, people may argue that someone with six hundred cattle but very
low expenditure cannot be poor. In principle an expenditure measure should incorporate all
aspects of consumption, but in practice this is very difficult to achieve. Despite the use of a
national consumption basket instead of a regional one (given that regional staple foods are
different), the general regional profile which the expenditure measures present coincide
very well with most people's impression of the regional profile of poverty.
A more substantial area of disagreement lies in the limitations of utilitarianism.
Discussions of poverty in Uganda very often involve discussions of poor motivation and
alcohol consumption; issues which most technical advisors and economists avoid because
they conflict with the usual assumptions of exogenous preferences and liberalism about
personal preferences, which  form the  core of neoclassical economics. In  this  context,
technical economic advice inevitably becomes involved in fundamental questions about
social values, which are important but conaplex  to address.
The extent to which a more equal distribution of income should be a goal of the
government is controversial in Uganda as in other countries. A poverty action plan cannot
avoid distributional issues, since any method of equalizing redistribution which does not
reduce total income will tend to reduce poverty. Therefore, the political context will usually
make equalizing reforms less easy to achieve than growth-enhancing reforms, except where
specific regional or other sectoral interests which are important to the government coincide
with the needs of equality.
7.2 Macroeconomicpolicies
The benefits  of  liberalizing export crop production are widely  understood in  Uganda.
Protection of industrial production, which also contributes to an antiexport bias, remains
more controversial both inside and outside government. One problem here is that while the
error of discrimination against exports is fairly established, a case can still be for protecting
"infant industry." The future distributional consequences of  the export-led strategy are
ambiguous. In 1992 export crop producers were poorer than the average Ugandan, by 1995
they were better off. The extent to which such a strategy will be propoor in the future will
therefore depend on the extent to which the poor are able to enter the expanding sectors in
the  coming  years.  Finally,  the  gender  impact  of  export  crop  production  remains
controversial. We would agree with those who argue that gender issues are best addressed
48through access to assets and education rather than by discouraging the best income-raising
opportunity available for many Ugandan households.
7.3 Public services
The  most  important  decision  was  the  selection  of  the  package  of  universal  basic
services-given  mass poverty and lack of capacity to target-and  the design of the package.
The most difficult thing here is to  limit the commitment to the feasibly affordable; for
instance, the costs of delivering basic health services could easily become prohibitive unless
the treatment regimes are kept very simple. The purpose of defining and publicizing a basic
package is undermined if  the package is not in  fact affordable (which also, of course,
depends on the balance between private and public finance and the extent of targeting).
Defining what is affordable will be difficult given the fact that the costs of services are not
widely known. For example,  agricultural extension is often dismissed as expensive, whereas
the large-scale provision of seed-proposed  as a superior alternative-is  likely to be much
more costly.
In some cases, the importance of basic services for the poor may be controversial.
But in most cases the main controversy  revolves not around the need for the services but the
role of the state. Observed generic failure to deliver services can justify either increases or
reductions in public funding.
A  second controversial area is  the scope  for charging and, where  services are
charged for, the possibility of exempting the poor. In Uganda's case, the principle of user
charging in health has been fiercely criticized by NGOs. There is no overwhelming reason
for the optimal rate of  subsidy to be  100 percent, even given substantial informational
failure, externalities and distributional concerns. It is in fact very difficult to set charges
sensibly in isolation from the design and costing of a basic package; there is also a very
strong case for allowing some local discretion in the levels of charges and in exemption
schemes as both the appropriate level of fees and effective methods of targeting are likely to
vary. This policy has been followed in the health sector; central guidelines on charging
exist, but the decision is local.
Much  the  same applies to  the  role of  NGOs  in delivering  services. Publicly
financed  services  can  be  delivered  through  health  maintenance  organizations  and
equivalent organizations in other sectors, and the decision whether to use these suppliers
should be a local one.
The basic package of services deserves to be settled at the national level for various
reasons. The newly formed local governments are more likely to function effectively if their
tasks and responsibilities are well defined and if people have a clear idea of what it is
reasonable to demand from those they elect. In practice, the division of labor between the
center and local governments has not been agreed causing problems to service delivery. An
indication of this are falling immunization  rates.
49Finally, the acceptance of a governmental responsibility to  deliver basic services
was  greatly  enhanced  by  the  1996  election  campaign;  the  government  switched  its
emphasis, quite suddenly, from advocacy of private responsibility to the delivery of free
public primary education. In Uganda's case, the shift of emphasis is to be welcomed, as the
performance of existing services  has been poorer than the economic performance.
7.4 Access to assets and credit
Although not part of the PEAP process, land issues were hotly debated in Uganda at the
same time. Land remains an extremely controversial issue, partly because mailo landlords
represent an ethnic as well as an economic interest group, and partly because Uganda's very
turbulent history suggests that the government should not alienate any major part of its
coalition. Moreover, land issues cannot be benignly neglected in view of the potential for
the revival of commercial rights on mailo land and of the ongoing titling of land in much of
Uganda.
The public provision of credit has been seen as a major part of poverty reduction
in Uganda. The difficulties encountered which such schemes in the recent past, however,
as well as the very public agony of reclaiming bad debts from former credit schemes has
encouraged a more cautious and perhaps more realistic consensus to emerge.
7.5 What has the PEAP  achieved ?
The discussion above has focused on the state of debate at the time of the drafting of the
first PEAP in 1997. The PEAP has been revised in 2000, and a summary of the revision
has been used as the Uganda's  Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). This process
has provided an opportunity to assess what has been achieved in the three years since the
original PEAP was adopted.
The PEAP provided  an agreed list of directly poverty-reducing  services to  be
prioritized in public expenditure decisions. The mechanism of the Poverty Action Fund,
which is an integral part of the budget and the government's  delivery system,  allowed
these priorities  to be implemented in a publicly  accountable way. Meanwhile,  sectoral
strategies have been prepared in several areas including transport, education, and health,
as well as the Plan for the Modernization of Agriculture. The PEAP was reviewed in the
Poverty Status Report in 1999 and was thoroughly updated in 2000. More than anything
else, the PEAP has provided a 'grammar of argument' in which the principles of poverty
reduction have entered debate in all sectors. It has arguably been able to play this role
because it was not too precise. Rather than anticipating the contents of sectoral strategies,
it provided a set of principles which could guide these strategies.
During  the discussions  of the PEAP  and the PRSP  in  2000,  one  issue which
emerged  was  an  ambiguity in  the term  'costing'.  Everyone  agrees, in  principle,  that
programs should be costed. But the term has two senses. One approach is to observe the
existing  resource  envelope  and  establish  a  list  of  activities  feasible  within  it.  This
50approach is useful for realism and play an important part in defining a realistic medium-
term expenditure framework. But there is no guarantee that the list of activities will be
closely related to  the ultimate  objectives. The  second approach is  to  define  a  set  of
objectives and work back to a resource need; this can then be reconciled with realistic
projections  of resources either by  increasing the available resources or by phasing the
implementation of programs over a number of years. Ultimately, these two exercises need
to be  reconciled, but  they need to be  conceived distinctly in the first  instance.  Often
costings  produced in  sectoral plans  represent a mixture  of the two  approaches, being
resource-constrained  and  hence inadequate  for the stated objectives.  The demand  for
programs  to  be  costed must  respect the  distinction between  the two  approaches  and
recognize that both tasks are conceptually and practically substantial.
In brief, the PEAP process in Uganda has
*  produced  a  clear  but  flexible  set  of  expenditure  priorities  which  have  been
reflected in the medium-term expenditure framework and annual budgets;
*  by being not too specific, allowed sectoral strategies to evolve;
*  enormously  increased  civil  society  involvement  in  policymaking  and  public
spending; and
*  promoted debate both within and outside the government.
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